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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used for critical applications such as health care,
traffic management or plant automation. Thus, we depend on their availability, and
reliable, resilient and accurate operation. It is therefore essential that these systems
are protected against attackers who may intend to interfere with operations. Existing
security mechanisms cannot always be directly transferred to the application domain of
WSNs, and in some cases even novel methods are desirable to give increased protection
to these systems.
The aim of the work presented in this thesis is to augment security of WSNs by
devising novel mechanisms and protocols. In particular, it contributes to areas which
require protection mechanisms but have not yet received much attention from the research
community. For example, the work addresses the issue of secure storage of data on sensor
nodes using cryptographic methods. Although cryptography is needed for basic protection,
it cannot always secure the sensor nodes as the keys might be compromised and key
management becomes more challenging as the number of deployed sensor nodes increases.
Therefore, the work includes mechanisms for node identification and tamper detection by
means other than pure cryptography.
The three core contributions of this thesis are (i) Methods for confidential data
storage on WSN nodes. In particular, fast and energy-efficient data storage and retrieval
while maintaining the required protection level is addressed. A framework is presented
that provides confidential data storage in WSNs with minimal impact on sensor node
operation and performance. This framework is further advanced by combining it with
secure communication in WSNs. With this framework, data is stored securely on the flash
ii
file system such that it can be directly used for secure transmission, which removes the
duplication of security operations on the sensor node. (ii) Methods for node identification
based on clock skew. Here, unique clock drift patterns of nodes, which are normally a
problem for wireless network operation, are used for non-cryptographic node identification.
Clock skew has been previously used for device identification, requiring timestamps to be
distributed over the network, but this is impractical in duty-cycled WSNs. To overcome
this problem, clock skew is measured locally on the node using precise local clocks.
(iii) Methods for tamper detection and node identification based on Channel State
Information (CSI). Characteristics of a wireless channel at the receiver are analysed using
the CSI of incoming packets to identify the transmitter and to detect tampering on it. If
an attacker tampers with the transmitter, it will have an effect on the CSI measured at
the receiver. However, tamper-unrelated events, such as walking in the communication
environment, also affect CSI values and cause false alarms. This thesis demonstrates
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Embedded systems are computer systems designed to handle a specific task, and they
are often based on microcontrollers. Microcontrollers are small computers made of
processor(s), memory and peripherals on a single circuit board. With increasing devel-
opments on microcontroller technology, embedded systems became the most common
form of computers. They are being used in everyday objects like smart phones, electric
toothbrushes, cars and credit cards. Other reasons for popularity of embedded systems
are the improvements to wireless technologies and integration of them with the embedded
systems. These networked embedded systems are the building blocks of Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs).
WSNs are made of sensor nodes that sense the environment conditions and report
back to a central station, usually called the sink. Sensor nodes are low-power embedded
systems, and have sensing, processing and communication capabilities. WSNs are used
in many application scenarios. Enabling Internet Protocol (IP) on WSNs, as well as on
other networked embedded systems, led to realisation of the Internet of Things (IoT). It
was estimated by Cisco that there were over 12.5 billion IoT objects used in 2010, and it
is predicted to be 50 billion by 20201.
WSNs use different wireless protocols based on their application requirements. Some
of these protocols include IEEE 802.15.4 and IEEE 802.11 standards, or proprietary pro-
1https://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT\.IBSG\.0411FINAL.pdf
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tocols. New hardware technologies capable of handling different protocols simultaneously
on a single device are also being developed. These technologies increase the usage of
WSNs even more.
1.1 Problem Statement and Thesis Aims
WSNs are used in many application scenarios, including critical applications such as
healthcare, traffic management and plant automation. These applications should work re-
liably, resiliently and accurately. Therefore, securing of these applications is of paramount
importance. There are many security solutions proposed for traditional computer systems,
but such solutions are designed to run on computers equipped with vast amounts of pro-
cessing power and memory, making it impossible to apply them directly on low-powered
sensor nodes that have limited processing and memory capabilities. Thus, existing
security solutions should be revised, or new solutions should be proposed, to be able to
secure WSNs.
The work presented in this thesis aims to enhance security of WSNs by designing
novel mechanisms and protocols that will help to optimise the usage of limited node
resources. The work contributes to areas that require protection mechanisms but have
not yet received much attention from the research community. The issue of secure storage
of data on sensor nodes is addressed, and mechanisms for node identification by means
other than pure cryptography are presented.
1.1.1 Motivation
Security in WSNs has to consider more than just the communication links. In particular,
sensor nodes make use of large local storage space in the form of flash memory to fulfil their
tasks. For example, a security camera attached to a sensor node may record images and
only provide image data (or the result of an image processing algorithm) on request. This
stored data on smart objects must be secured as well in addition to the communication
links used to access and transport this data. This is particularly important as sensor
nodes may be easy to access and to retrieve by an attacker. Furthermore, sensor nodes
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are expected to be cheap and deployed in large quantities. It can be expected that devices
are thrown away at the end of their lifetime, and that a proper decommissioning process
in which data would be erased is not commercially viable. Therefore, the stored data on
sensor nodes should be cryptographically protected. Methods for efficient secure storage
using cryptographic methods are presented in this thesis.
Although cryptographic methods are essential for protection, they are expensive for
sensor nodes that have limited battery life and scarce processing power. Key management
also becomes more challenging with the number of deployed sensor nodes increasing.
Necessity for cryptographic methods should be reduced as much as possible. Further-
more, cryptographic methods cannot address all the security problems. For example, a
surveillance system might use wireless cameras to monitor critical infrastructures such
as an airport or power plant. Classical cryptography can be used to authenticate data
transmitted from the camera devices. However, tampering with a device (e.g. movement
or change of viewpoint) cannot be detected using cryptographic methods. For these
reasons, it is desirable to provide an additional layer of defence. An attacker may also
obtain key material and replace a node in the deployment to inject false observation data.
For these reasons, it is desirable to provide an additional layer of defence. To prevent
these kinds of attacks, various methods have been proposed to bind the identification
and authentication to the device hardware. Using special custom chips or hardware char-
acteristics of the device are some of the options. Custom chips are expensive and require
changes on the node design. Therefore, mechanisms that use hardware characteristics of
the device are more desirable. This thesis presents mechanisms for node identification
and tamper detection that do not require cryptographic operations or any additional
hardware.
1.1.2 Contributions
The three core contributions of this thesis are:
1. Methods for confidential data storage on WSN nodes.
2. Methods for node identification based on clock skew.
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3. Methods for tamper detection and node identification based on Channel State
Information (CSI).
1.1.2.1 Confidential Data Storage for Wireless Sensor Networks
Many WSNs are used to collect and process confidential information. Confidentiality
must be ensured at all times and, for example, solutions for confidential communication,
processing or storage are required. To date, the research community has addressed mainly
the issue of confidential communication. Efficient solutions for cryptographically secured
communication and associated key exchange in WSNs exist. However, as many WSN
applications rely heavily on available on-node storage space, which is easily exposed to
an attacker, it is essential to ensure the confidentiality of that stored data. This thesis
presents Codo, a confidential data storage solution, which balances platform performance
and security requirements. An implementation of Codo for the Contiki WSN operating
system is provided, along with a performance evaluation.
Following from this work, the confidential data storage framework is combined with
secure communication in WSNs, more specifically in IoT. The future IoT may be based
on the existing and established IP. Many IoT application scenarios will handle sensitive
data. However, as security requirements for storage and communication are addressed
separately, work such as key management or cryptographic processing is duplicated. This
part of the thesis presents a framework that allows us to combine secure storage and
secure communication in the IP-based IoT. We see how data can be stored securely such
that it can be delivered securely upon request without further cryptographic processing.
1.1.2.2 Node Identification Based on Clock Skew
Clocks on wireless sensor nodes experience a natural drift. This clock skew is unique
for each node as it depends on the clock's manufacturing characteristics. Clock skew
can be used as unique node identifier that is useful for node authentication. We will
see how clock skew of a node's clock can be measured directly on the node by utilising
the available high-precision radio transceiver clock. A detailed implementation of this
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proposed local clock skew tracking method for the Zolertia Z1 platform is presented. We
see how the required sampling effort to accurately measure clock skew can be determined.
How clock skew measurements can be aligned with existing transceiver operations in
order to avoid an increase in energy consumption is also discussed.
1.1.2.3 Tamper Detection and Node Identification Based on Channel State Infor-
mation
Wireless devices are often used in application scenarios with strict security requirements.
Examples are physical intrusion detection systems commonly used to protect factories,
airports or government buildings. In such scenarios, additional security features such as
tamper detection are highly desirable to complement traditional cryptographic mecha-
nisms. In this work, we see how to use CSI, extracted from off-the-shelf 802.11n Wi-Fi
cards, to calculate a tamper-evidence value for transmitters. This value enables detection
of tampering due to device movement or replacement. Algorithms for tamper-evidence
value computation are described, and the interpretation of this value is discussed and its
effectiveness is evaluated. Unfortunately, not only tamper events lead to CSI fluctuations;
movement of people in the communication environment has an impact too. Analysis of
CSI values of a transmission simultaneously at multiple receivers is proposed to improve
distinction of tamper and movement events. A moving person is expected to have an
impact on some but not all communication links between transmitter and the receivers.
A tamper event impacts on all links between transmitter and the receivers. The necessary
algorithms for the proposed multi-receiver tamper detection method are described. In
particular, the tamper detection capability in practical deployments with varying intensity
of people movement is analysed. In our experiments, the proposed system deployed in a
busy office environment is capable of detecting 53\% of tamper events while creating zero
false alarms.
5
Chapter 1 Thesis Outline
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 begins with a brief background about the topics related to the works in the
thesis. It then gives an overview of the related work in security of WSNs, and discusses
the related work for the individual chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 3 explains Codo, the confidential data storage solution for WSNs. It gives
a design specification, explains the implementation, and evaluates the different aspects
of Codo. The chapter then explains the framework for combined secure storage and
communication for IoT with a detailed implementation and evaluation.
Chapter 4 describes our clock-skew-based node identification method. It describes
the local clock skew determination process and gives an analysis of clock sampling
requirements.
Chapter 5 explains tamper detection mechanism based on CSI. It describes a method
for tamper evidence computation and gives a detection analysis.




Background and Related Work
This chapter first gives a brief background in Section 2.1 about the topics on which the
works in the thesis are based. It then discusses the related work for individual chapters
in Section 2.2.
2.1 Background
This thesis proposes novel security mechanisms for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).
Therefore, this section starts with brief background on Information Security (Section 2.1.1)
and WSNs (Section 2.1.2). A combined secure storage and secure communication frame-
work is proposed in Chapter 3. This framework uses IPv6/6LoWPAN and IPsec/ESP
protocols, and necessary background is given in Sections 2.1.4 and 2.1.5. Chapter 5
proposes a node identification and tamper detection mechanism using Channel State
Information (CSI) of 802.11n networks. An overview of the 802.11n standard is given in
Section 2.1.6.
Background information given here is mainly brief explanations of the concepts. More
detailed information is given about the proposed solutions in each chapter if necessary.
2.1.1 Information Security
Information Security is a practice of protecting data on a computer system from those




\bullet Confidentiality is the prevention of disclosure of the information to unauthorized
parties.
\bullet Integrity is the prevention of modification of the information by unauthorized
parties.
\bullet Availability is the ability to provide the information to authorized parties when it
is needed.
\bullet Non-repudiation is the prevention of a sending/receiving party of a transaction
from denying that it sent/received the transmission.
Access Control is another important concept in Information Security. It controls who
can access the information on a computer system. It usually consists of three steps:
\bullet Identification is claiming what something is or who someone is, for example,
providing a user name to a system.
\bullet Authentication is verifying the claim, for example asking a password for a given
user name.
\bullet Authorization is giving someone or something permission to a given system after
passing identification and authentication steps.
This thesis proposes a combined confidential storage and communication framework,
that efficiently provides integrity, in Chapter 3. Clock skew values are used to identify
sensor nodes in Chapter 4. These values can further be used for authentication. In
Chapter 5, channel characteristics are used to identify wireless devices and detect
tampering.
2.1.2 Wireless Sensor Networks
AWireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a wireless network consisting of sensor nodes that are





Figure 2.1: A typical multi-hop Wireless Sensor Network.
radio transceiver, a battery and several sensors. Each monitors and senses the environment,
and reports back to a central node, usually called the sink. Data is generally sent from a
node to the sink in a multi-hop fashion, where the intermediate nodes between the node
and the sink participate in the sending operation. A typical multi-hop WSN is depicted
in Figure 2.1.
WSNs are used in many application scenarios such as environmental, health, home,
industrial, military, and so on. Based on the application requirements, they use different
wireless protocols. The most popular of these is the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. WSNs
also use the IEEE 802.11 standard, Bluetooth and proprietary protocols. An application
can use multiple protocols at the same time as well. One example scenario is a home
automation system consisting of a wireless camera, a connected light switch, a temperature
sensor and a controller that controls these devices. The wireless camera uses 802.11, the
light switch uses a proprietary protocol (for example LightwaveRF), and the temperature
sensor uses 802.15.4 to connect to the controller. Additionally, new hardware technologies
capable of handling different protocols simultaneously on a single device also exist.
2.1.3 IEEE 802.15.4
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines the physical layer and media access control for
low-data-rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs), which require low-cost and
low-speed communication between devices. 802.15.4 specifies wireless communication
techniques, wireless spectrum to be used and media access control algorithms. A simple












(ZigBee, ISA100.11a, WirelessHART, ...)
Figure 2.2: A simple diagram of IEEE 802.15.4 protocol stack.
802.15.4 can operate on three different frequency bands: 2.4 GHz (global), 915 MHz
(North America), and 868 MHz (Europe). Data rates are 20 to 250 kbps and the
transmission range of the devices varies between 10m and 100m. 802.15.4 uses Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) (most common), Parallel Sequence Spread Spectrum
(PSSS), Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS) or Direct Sequence Ultra Wideband (DSUWB)
technologies for the physical layer modulation technique.
Media access control enables the control of the 802.15.4 packets transmitted over
the air. It provides management and data services to the upper layers. Upper layer
specifications such as ZigBee, ISA100.11a and WirelessHART extend the standard based
on the application requirements.
2.1.4 6LoWPAN
Every device on the Internet has a numerical label, called Internet Protocol (IP) address,
that is used for device identification and location addressing. Internet Protocol version
4 (IPv4) is the most used version of the IP protocol. IPv4 has a 32-bit address space,
and it can assign 232 addresses. With the increase of the devices available on the Internet,
more addresses than IPv4 could handle were needed. Therefore, Internet Protocol version
6 (IPv6) was proposed. IPv6 has a 128-bit address space allowing 2128 addresses, more
than 7.9\times 1028 times as many as IPv4 can offer.
Although IPv6 allows a huge number of devices to be addressed on the Internet, low
powered networked embedded devices were being left out from the Internet because of their
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0 1 1 TF NH NLIM CID SAC SAM M DAC DAM
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15BIT:
TF  : Traffic Class
NH  : Next Header
HLIM: Hop Limit
CID : Context Identifier
SAC : Source Address Compression
SAM : Source Address Mode
M   : Multicast Compression
DAC : Destination Address Compression
DAM : Destination Address Mode
Figure 2.3: LOWPAN IPHC encoding in 6LoWPAN.
Var-len ID Compressed Next Header...
Figure 2.4: General LOWPAN NHC encoding in 6LoWPAN.
limited processing ability and small packet size. WSNs mostly use the 802.15.4 standard,
and packet sizes in 802.15.4 are too small to use IPv6. The Maximum Transmission Unit
(MTU) must be at least 1280 bytes in IPv6, while the packet size of 802.15.4 is 127 bytes.
IPv6 Over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) was introduced to
this end, and it allowed embedded devices to use the IP protocol. 6LoWPAN-enabled
devices can send and receive IPv6 packets over 802.15.4-based networks, thanks to the
encapsulation and header-compression mechanisms of 6LoWPAN. It compresses the IPv6
header, and increases the payload carried in 802.15.4 frames. Enabling IP on networked
embedded systems led to the realisation of the Internet of Things (IoT).
Header-compression mechanisms defined by 6LoWPAN use LOWPAN IPHC for IP
header compression and LOWPAN NHC for the next-header compression. Figure 2.3
shows the LOWPAN IPHC header. The IP header length is reduced to 2 bytes for
single-hop networks and to 7 bytes for multi-hop networks with LOWPAN IPHC. When
the next header field is set to 1 in LOWPAN IPHC, the next header of compressed
IPv6 header will be encoded with LOWPAN NHC. A general LOWPAN NHC header
is shown in Figure 2.4. The length of LOWPAN NHC header can be 1 or more bytes.
The first variable bits are used to identify the next header type, and the remaining
bits encode the header information. 6LoWPAN defines LOWPAN NHC for only IP
extension header (LOWPAN NHC EH) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) header
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[01]  # ESP SAs using 192 bit long keys (168 + 24 parity)
[02]  add 192.168.1.100 192.168.2.100 esp 0x201 -E 3des-cbc
[03]          0x7aeaca3f87d060a12f4a4487d5a5c3355920fae69a96c831;
[04]  add 192.168.2.100 192.168.1.100 esp 0x301 -E 3des-cbc
[05]          0xf6ddb555acfd9d77b03ea3843f2653255afe8eb5573965df;
Figure 2.5: An example of ESP SAs taken from an IPsec configuration file on Ubuntu operating
system.
(LOWPAN NHC UDP).
The combined secure storage and communication framework proposed in Chapter 3
is based on IPv6/6LoWPAN protocols.
2.1.5 IPsec
IPv6 communications between two end points are secured by Internet Protocol Secu-
rity (IPsec). IPsec is a protocol suite that includes Authentication Header (AH) and
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). AH provides integrity and data origin authenti-
cation. ESP provides integrity, data origin authentication and also confidentiality. IPsec
uses Security Associations (SA) that keep the bundle of algorithms and parameters
necessary for AH and ESP operations. There is also a 32-bit indexing parameter, called
the Security Parameter Index (SPI), in each SA that is used by a receiver to identify the
correct SA.
An example of ESP SAs taken from an IPsec configuration file on the Ubuntu operating
system is shown in Figure 2.5. There are two 192-bit keys defined for communications
from 192.168.1.100 to 192.168.2.100 and from 192.168.2.100 to 192.168.1.100 on lines 3
and 5, respectively. The numbers after each esp keyword represent SPIs, and they must
be unique. The 3DES algorithm in CBC mode is used for encryption.
2.1.5.1 IPsec for 6LoWPAN
IPsec is defined for IPv6, and it is not suitable to use directly on 6LoWPAN packets.
Therefore, a definition for AH and ESP encodings for 6LoWPAN is provided in [RDH+12],
in addition to the IP extension header and the UDP header encodings. They use IP




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7BIT:
EID: Extension Header ID
NH : Next Header
0 EID NH
Figure 2.6: LOWPAN NHC EH encoding in 6LoWPAN.
1 1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7BIT:
SPI: Security Parameter Index
SN : Sequence Number
NH : Next Header
0 NHSPI SN
Figure 2.7: LOWPAN NHC ESP encoding in 6LoWPAN.
(LOWPAN NHC ESP) extension headers.
LOWPAN NHC EH header is shown in Figure 2.6. The Extension Header ID field
is used to identify whether the next header is an AH or ESP header. The Next Header
field is set to 1 to indicate that the next header is LOWPAN NHC encoded.
Since only IPsec/ESP is used in Chapter 3, an explanation of the LOWPAN NHC AH
extension header is omitted here. The LOWPAN NHC ESP extension header is depicted
in Figure 2.7. Its fields are defined as follows:
\bullet The first four bits in the LOWPAN NHC ESP represent the NHC ID defined for
ESP. These are set to 1110.
\bullet If SPI = 00: the default SPI for the 802.15.4 network is used, and the SPI field is
omitted. We set the default SPI value to 1. This does not mean that all nodes use
the same SA, but that every node has a single preferred SA, identified by SPI 1.
If SPI = 01: First 8 bits of the SPI are carried inline; the remaining 24 bits are
elided.
If SPI = 10: First 16 bits of the SPI are carried inline; the remaining 16 bits are
elided.
If SPI = 11: All 32 bits of the SPI are carried inline.
\bullet If SN = 0: The first 16 bits of the sequence number are used. The remaining 16
bits are assumed to be zero.
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If SN = 1: All 32 bits of the sequence number are carried inline.
\bullet If NH = 0: The next header field in ESP will be used to specify the next header,
and it is carried inline.
If NH = 1: The next header will be encoded using LOWPAN NHC. In case
of ESP, this would require the end systems to perform 6LoWPAN compres-
sion/decompression and encryption/decryption jointly.
Combined secure storage and communication framework proposed in Chapter 3 is
based on IPsec/ESP protocols.
2.1.6 IEEE 802.11n
The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies the physical layer and media access control for
wireless local-area network communications. 802.11n is an amendment to 802.11, and it
was first proposed in 2002 and its final draft was approved in 2009. 802.11n can operate
on 2.4 or 5 GHz frequency bands, and it provides data rates from 6 to 600 Mbit/s.
Wireless systems based on 802.11 standards are called Wi-Fi systems.
The 802.11n standard uses a Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) technique,
where multiple antennas are used by both transmitter and receiver. MIMO helps to
improve the network reliability and performance with spatial diversity and spatial
multiplexing techniques. Network reliability can be improved with spatial diversity
by sending the same data from all the antennas, and network performance can be
improved with spatial multiplexing by sending independent data streams from different
spatial dimensions. Transmitters decide which technique to use according to the channel
conditions. Therefore, receivers have to estimate the amplitude changes and phase shifts
on the channel, and report back this information to the transmitters. The estimation of
the channel is called Channel State Information (CSI). An example of a MIMO system












Figure 2.9: An OFDM signal in the frequency domain.
2.1.6.1 Beamforming and Spatial Expansion
802.11n uses Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) as a modulation
scheme. In OFDM, information is sent by multiple subcarriers (or subchannels) sc within
the same single channel. An example of an OFDM signal in the frequency domain is
depicted in Figure 2.9.
The wireless channel can be described linearly on each subcarrier as a matrix HscR\times T
where the signals of each transmission antenna T sc1 . . . T
sc
T are projected onto the reception
antennas Rsc1 . . . R
sc
R . Transmitters can perform beamforming or spatial expansion using
filtering matrices FscT\times S instead of directly transmitting data streams over each trans-
mission antenna. Spatial expansion improves reliability (but also increases redundancy)
by expanding a data stream to several transmission antennas. Beamforming improves
performance by allowing the transmission of multiple spatial streams Ssc1 . . . S
sc
S in parallel.
The transmitter performs Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) on the channel matrix
and decides whether spatial expansion or beamforming should be used. If we represent
the CSI matrix as MscR\times S measured for each subcarrier sc, the channel can be modelled
as
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which can be written in a shorter form as





where R, T and S are the numbers of reception antennas, transmission antennas and
spatial streams, respectively. Here, Rsc, Fsc and Ssc are the corresponding signal vectors
per subcarrier sc.
Chapter 5 uses CSI values of 802.11n OFDM networks for tamper detection. CSI
values for each subcarrier provide rich information about the wireless channel.
2.2 Related Work
Security research in WSNs has received much attention over the years with the increasing
use of WSNs. Unlike the wired or conventional wireless networks, WSNs operate with
sensor nodes that have limited resources in terms of processing, memory, power or
bandwidth. Therefore, traditional security solutions cannot be applied to WSNs directly,
and so security needs special care.
We proceed with an overview of existing work on security in WSNs. The following
sections then explain the existing work in detail related to the each chapters of the thesis.
Researchers have presented attacks against the functions of different network protocol
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layers of WSNs [CMYP09b]. These attacks can be applied to a single layer or multiple
layers of the protocol, and they include jamming, collusion, unfairness, etc. Cryptography
is the first solution that comes to mind to circumvent most of these attacks, as is the
case in any other systems.
Various cryptographic algorithms are investigated for their suitability to the require-
ments of sensor nodes with limited resources [CMYP09b]. New cryptographic libraries,
methods and platforms are also proposed. Arazi et al. proposed an RSA-based framework
against DoS attacks that causes an attacker's resources to become exhausted before the
sensor's resources do [AQR07]. secFlek is a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) based on a
public-key platform that provides energy efficiency and fast security [SHCO08, HCSO09].
Liu et al. proposed TinyECC, a flexible and configurable Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy (ECC) library for WSNs [LN08]. Application of pairing-based cryptography to
WSNs and its implementation were investigated in [SKSC09]. Kothmayr et al. pro-
posed an end-to-end security solution for IoT-based on Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) [KHS+11].
Cryptographic operations come with the key-management problem. Considering the
dynamic structure of WSNs, key management becomes more troublesome [CMYP09b,
JBMC10, CY05]. An asynchronous key-distribution scheme for WSNs was proposed in
[Han09]. The scheme does not need time synchronization, making it an efficient solution.
A new key-management method was proposed by Nilsson at al. [NRLV08]. Their method
provides backward and forward secrecy. Hang et al. proposed a new key-agreement
protocol [HUW11]. The protocol is based on Diffie-Hellman key-agreement and provides
perfect forward secrecy. Gauge et al. presented a solution for secure key assignment
for WSNs [GSM09]. The solution is easy and convenient to use and robust against
eavesdroppers.
There are security architectures for WSNs that use these cryptographic and key-
management solutions. The most popular ones are TinySec [KSW04] and MiniSec
[LMPG07]. TinySec is the first link-layer security architecture for WSNs. Although
it achieves low energy consumption, it reduces the level of protection. MiniSec is the
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successor of TinySec, and achieves low energy consumption while providing higher security.
Both TinySec and MiniSec are implemented on the TinyOS operating system. Casado et
al. proposed ContikiSec, a security architecture for the Contiki operating system [CT09].
Various security issues in WSNs like secure routing [CMYP09b], secure data ag-
gregation [OM07, Yu09, BJT12], secure localization [ZCHX09, MSS10], secure code
dissemination [LON08, TOZJ09], and broadcast authentication [RYLZ09], have also been
addressed. Intrusion detection [KBG+09, WFA09] and anomaly detection [ZB11] meth-
ods have been investigated for WSNs. Analyses of memory protection [KKS07, CAE+07],
code injection [FC08], buffer overflow [GN08], software-based attestation [CFPS09], and
access control [FGS09] have also received attention in the research community [GFN11].
There are also privacy-oriented works, including query privacy [CYS+10], privacy for
data aggregation [ILM\'e10], source-location privacy [SHZ+09, KFLFS11], event-source
unobservability [YSZ+08, BGTB11] and sink unobservability [BBT11].
The next sections will discuss the related work in detail for the individual chapters
of the thesis: (i) Confidential Data Storage in WSNs; (ii) Node Identification Based on
Clock Skew; (iii) Tamper Detection and Node Identification Based on CSI.
2.2.1 Confidential Data Storage in Wireless Sensor Networks
Existing work proposes many novel security mechanisms and approaches for WSNs
[CMYP09a]. However, the existing work is mostly focused on securing communication.
Still, there are several contributions on secure file storage in WSNs which is most related to
the presented work. The existing solutions cover individual aspects of Codo (confidential
secure storage framework presented here), such as key management or integration with
available flash memory structure, but do not address all aspects.
Bhatnagar and Miller presented a secure and reliable file system [BM07]. A unique
seed is assigned to each node before the deployment and nodes use this seed to generate
keys. Every encryption operation uses a newly generated key. The key generation process
cannot be reversed and, therefore, when an adversary steals the node he cannot decrypt
already encrypted data and he can only access a small amount of data which is not
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encrypted yet. This approach is very secure but prevents a node from accessing stored
data, which is necessary for any in-network processing. In contrast, Codo allows nodes
to access stored data for processing.
Systems described by Pietro et al. [PMST08] and Girao et al. [GWMA07] are similar
to the previous described solution. All of these solutions use key generation methods
that prevent nodes from accessing data locally.
Ren et al. proposed a secure, dependable and distributed storage scheme [RRZ08].
Different to the previous solutions, they suggest public key encryption to ensure data
confidentiality. In this case, the stored data can also not be accessed by nodes. In
addition, public key cryptography requires more processing than symmetric cryptography
as used in Codo.
Considering its speed and better security (e.g. resistant to cold boot attacks) hardware-
based storage encryption has been made available lately by many vendors. An example
company Ironkey [Iro] manufactures secure USB flash drives in which implemented
hardware-based AES 256-bit encryption in CBC mode. Codo is different to these
solutions as it does not rely on special storage hardware.
In the second part of this work, the secure storage framework is combined with secure
communication solutions in IoT to remove the duplication of security operations on
the sensor node. Solutions for secure communication and secure storage of data in the
IP-based IoT exist, but these functions are generally designed and operated independently
of each other. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that aims to combine
both aspects. Secure storage solutions are discussed above. The secure communication
solutions will be discussed in the next paragraphs.
Communication in the IoT can be secured on different layers. The IoT uses the IEEE
802.15.4 [IEE03] link-layer. IEEE 802.15.4 link-layer security is the current state-of-the-
art security solution for the IP-connected IoT; it defines data encryption and integrity
verification.
IEEE 802.15.4 security does not provide end-to-end security when connecting an
IEEE 802.15.4 network via a gateway router to the existing Internet. Thus, additional
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solutions exist that protect data traveling from Internet hosts to the border router. For
example, ArchRock PhyNET [Arc08] applies IPsec in tunnel mode between the gateway
router and Internet hosts.
To achieve true end-to-end security between Internet hosts and smart objects, an
IPsec extension for 6LoWPAN has been proposed [RDH+12]. Unmodified Internet hosts
can communicate directly with smart objects. The border router applies 6LoWPAN
header compression in order to enable efficient transport of IPsec packets in IEEE 802.15.4
networks. This mechanism is used for the framework proposed in the thesis.
End-to-end security can be provided by using Transport Layer Security (TLS) or its
predecessor Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). SSL has been proposed as security mechanism
for the IoT by Hong et al. [HKH+10]. Foulagar et al. propose a TLS implementation for
smart objects [FMMA06].
2.2.2 Node Identification Based on Clock Skew
Clock skew is the deviation of a clock from the true time. Fingerprinting devices using
clock skew is carried out by comparing frequencies of two clocks, one of them generally
assumed to represent the true time.
Kohno et al [KBC05] has shown that clock skew of devices can be measured to
fingerprint devices. It is shown that the clock skew of each device is unique and stays
fairly consistent over time.
Zander et al. [ZM08] improved clock skew measurement by applying a technique called
synchronized sampling. They demonstrated that synchronization of samples reduces the
quantisation error and hence improves skew determination quality.
Jana et al. [JK08] used clock skew to fingerprint wireless devices. The motivation
for their work was the detection of fake wireless access points. Their work demonstrates
that emitting timestamped beacons with high frequency allows for precise clock skew
calculation. According to their observations, 50 to 100 beacons are sufficient to estimate
clock skew accurately enough to identify individual nodes.
Arackaparambil et al. [ABSK10] demonstrated a clock skew spoofing attack in 802.11
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networks by using virtual interfaces. In their work they propose methods to combat clock
skew spoofing and propose standardised interfaces that would allow network providers to
publish clock skew information.
Huang et al. [HTW+08] demonstrated clock-skew-based identification in wireless
sensor networks in the context of the Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP)
[MKSL04]. FTSP provides coarse estimation of clock skew based on current offset and
previous skew (it uses linear regression on the past 8 data points).
Uddin et al. [UC10] demonstrated that sensor nodes have a unique clock skew and
that the clock skew of a node can easily be monitored.
Murdoch et al. [Mur06] split skew into two components, a constant and a variable
part. The variable part is affected by temperature changes and this effect was used to
reveal node identities in the The Onion Router (TOR) network by influencing CPU load
and hence the temperature of devices leading to measurable clock skew changes.
The proposed mechanism in the thesis differs from existing approaches as clock skew is
measured locally on nodes. It is believed that this is a necessary step towards a practical
system as variations in communication delays cannot be avoided in any real-world WSN
deployment. Furthermore, it is shown how clock skew measurements fit with energy-
efficient operations of sensor nodes and investigate the required sampling effort in detail.
Existing work with the exception of Huang et al. [HTW+08] calculate clock skew offline
after a long sequence of samples are collected, using a linear programming approach.
Huang et al. [HTW+08] calculate clock skew online using a linear regression approach
which is adapted in this work.
2.2.3 Tamper Detection and Node Identification Based on Channel State
Information
Existing work can be grouped into two main categories: transmitter identification
and transmitter localisation. Transmitter identification aims to use received signal
characteristics to identify the transmitting device (or class of device). Transmitter
localisation aims to use the received signal characteristics to determine the location (or
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area) of the transmitter. The work presented in this thesis falls into both areas. It
differs from existing work in four main ways: (i) Most existing work is not based on
802.11n OFDM and no work so far has incorporated the fact that dynamic adaptation
of the number of spatial independent streams in 802.11n must be taken into account.
(ii) Existing work is mostly aimed at rejecting individual messages from an attacker,
while the aim of this work is to determine a tamper-evidence value based on a number
of incoming transmissions. (iii) Existing work does not evaluate the relation between
transmitter movement and detection capability of a detection system. (iv) Existing
tamper detection systems do not work in practical deployments as they do not address
properly the separation of environmental and tamper events.
A number of recent works aim at transmitter localisation using channel characteristics.
Li et al. [LXMT06] proposed a method for PHY layer authentication based on measuring
the Channel Frequency Response (CFR). Three USRP/GNURadio Software Defined
Radios (SDRs) are deployed at different locations and used as transmitter, receiver and
attacker. Transmitter and attacker send packets alternately to the receiver. By employing
a change-point detector, transmissions can be distinguished. Patwari et al. [PK07] used
Channel Impulse Response (CIR) information to construct link signatures for location
distinction. A history of N  - 1 transmission signatures is compared with the Nth
transmission signature using the Euclidean distance to decide whether the transmission
is from a new location. The method in [PK07] analyses features in the time domain
whereas [LXMT06] operates in the frequency domain. Additionally, [LXMT06] uses a
complex-valued signature where the phase information is included, while [PK07] uses a
real-valued signature where the phase information is excluded. Zhang et al. [ZFPK08]
combined the best features of [LXMT06] and [PK07], which are (i) the advantage of
operating in the time domain and (ii) the advantage of using complex-valued signatures.
Recently, Jiang et al. [JZL+13] proposed a source-authentication method to detect
spoofing attacks on 802.11n Management Frames (MFs) by using CSI. Although this
work is not aimed at location distinction, it uses the same source of information (CSI) as
used in this thesis. It is shown that amplitude of CSI changes for injected frames. To
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the best our knowledge, this work is the closest one to the work presented in this thesis
in terms of source of information, encoding methods and test devices. However, the work
does not consider encoding using independent spatial streams as it is used in practical
802.11n deployments. Faria et al. [FC06] created signalprints based on Received Signal
Strength (RSS) information to identify wireless devices with respect to their locations.
However, the method proposed here uses a richer set of channel characteristics.
In addition to location identification, PHY-layer information is also used for device
identification. Brik et al. [BBGO08] used modulation errors to identify 802.11 devices
caused by modulator circuitry. The transient part of the RF signal was used to identify
802.11 [US07] and 802.15.4 [DC09] devices. Danev et al. [DHBC09] used RF burst
information to identify RFID transponders. Xiong et al. [XJ13] identified Wi-Fi clients
by looking at the angle-of-arrival information of clients' incoming signals by leveraging
multi-antenna Access Points (APs). More detailed information about device identification
based on PHY-layer information can be found in [DZC12].
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Confidential Data Storage for
Wireless Sensor Networks
In the first part of this chapter, the Codo framework will be explained. Codo provides
confidential data storage in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) with minimal impact on
sensor node operation and performance1. Combined secure communication and secure
storage in WSNs will be explained in the second part of the chapter. This combination
removes the duplication of security operations on the sensor node.
3.1 Confidential Data Storage for Wireless Sensor Networks
In many WSNs sensor data is transferred immediately to a sink for analysis and/or
storage. In such application cases no data is stored on nodes and confidentiality of stored
information is not an issue. However, a number of (recent) applications use available on-
node storage space to add new features or to improve network performance. For example,
on-node storage may be used as insufficient network capacity is available to transport all
gathered data from all nodes to the sink. Instead, stored data is pre-processed by nodes
and only processing results are transmitted. The sink may as well request processing or
transmission of stored data.
1This chapter is based on the papers titled ``Codo: Confidential Data Storage for Wireless Sensor
Networks"", ``Combined Secure Storage and Communication for the Internet of Things"" and ``Fusion:
coalesced confidential storage and communication framework for the IoT"".
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An example application is industrial process monitoring and control [SSW+09]. Sen-
sors may be used to collect and store vast amounts of data on production processes.
Nodes process sensor data and transmit results to a sink node. At times, the sink may
request nodes to process sensor data over specific time periods (e.g. to calculate the
average of a sensor reading over a recent set time period) or request all sampling points
in a specific time period. Such specific data requests may be necessary for error diagnosis
or to calibrate the overall production processes. As sensors store information about
production processes, it is of vital interest to a company to keep such information hidden
from competitors. If a node is removed from the facility, it should not be possible to
retrieve the stored data.
To secure data stored on nodes it has been proposed to simply encrypt the data
before storage using key chains (see for example [BM07, RRZ08]). Such a naive approach
ensures confidentiality but at the same time restricts a node's capability and does not
consider performance issues. Such existing solutions do not enable nodes to access already
stored data for in-network data processing on nodes and do not allow us to balance
performance and security concerns. Furthermore, existing solutions are not tailored
to hardware specifics such as flash memory layout or available hardware support for
cryptographic algorithms.
In the first part of this chapter we present Codo, a framework for efficient confidential
data storage on sensor nodes. Codo addresses the aforementioned shortcomings present
in existing solutions. Codo allows for confidential data storage while enabling in-network
data processing on nodes. Security concerns and performance can be balanced by
deciding how much unencrypted data can be present on a node at any given point in
time. Encrypted data storage is aligned with flash memory layout and cryptographic
hardware support. The specific contributions of this work are:
\bullet Codo: We give a design specification of the efficient confidential data storage
framework.
\bullet Codo Implementation: We detail the implementation of Codo for the Contiki
operating system [DGV04] running on a Tmote Sky. In particular, we show the
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integration of Codo with the Contiki flash file system Coffee [TDZV09].
\bullet Codo Evaluation: We evaluate the different aspects of Codo and quantify perfor-
mance implications.
Existing confidential data storage solutions have a number of shortcomings and
limitations. Rather than addressing each aspect individually it is necessary to tackle all
aspects together; as it is then possible to optimize usage of limited node resources. Next
we discuss shortcomings of existing solutions and then describe Codo, the confidential
storage framework that addresses these.
3.1.1 Limitations of Existing Solutions
Security Issues Most existing solutions encrypt all data with a single key before storage.
Only the owner of the key (for example, the sink) is able to decrypt stored data. Such
a solution has the drawback that security depends on a single point of failure; if the
key is revealed all data can be accessed. A better approach is to store chunks of data
using individual keys (for example, as described by Bhatnagar et al. [BM07] where
an irreversible key chain starting with a random seed is constructed). With such an
approach, a single key loss does not lead to a total loss of confidentiality. However, such
a solution still does not address the important WSN aspect of in-network processing
on nodes. Many sensor node applications rely on the nodes' ability to process previous
stored data. Mechanisms to retrieve keys for previously stored chunks of data must be
available. Another approach is to use public key cryptography [RRZ08]. Private keys are
stored in the sink, therefore an adversary cannot decrypt the data. However with this
approach, the stored data can also not be accessed by nodes. Furthermore, public key
cryptography generally requires a lot of processing resources that are not available on
sensor nodes.
Performance Issues Existing security solutions focus on optimizing encryption perfor-
mance (for example, by optimizing encryption algorithms [SOS+08] or by employing
specialised cryptographic hardware [HCSO09]). However, performance gains that result
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from looking at a secure storage solution from a systems perspective are largely ignored.
In existing solutions, data is generally encrypted as soon as it produced (for example,
in [BM07, RRZ08, PMST08, GWMA07]). However, for many applications it is from a
security perspective possible to cache data unencrypted before performing bulk encryption
and storage. Obviously, the amount of data that can be cached unencrypted will depend
on the specific application.
Hardware Issues Current solutions are hardware agnostic, which leads to inefficiencies.
Flash memories used on sensor nodes are restricted in terms of read and write capabilities.
It is often only possible to access chunks of data rather than in individual bytes and
it is always more efficient to process data in chunks. Thus, crypto mechanisms should
operate on chunk sizes that reflect hardware capabilities. Existing solutions also ignore
that hardware support for cryptographic operations exists on WSN nodes. Hardware
support is generally available for secure communication but it is possible to re-use these
features for secure storage. Again, the cryptographic hardware is optimised for specific
data chunk sizes and, if used in the context of storage, these hardware restrictions must
be taken into account.
3.1.2 Codo: Confidential Data Storage Framework
Codo tackles the aforementioned limitations and shortcomings of existing confidential
data storage solutions. The framework aims to realize confidential data storage with
minimal impact on node operation and performance. Nodes should be able to store
and access stored data as possible without confidential storage. Nodes should prevent
performance degradation due to the additional security functions as much as possible.
In our proposed storage framework data is organised in DataChunks. Some unen-
crypted data is cached to improve performance; depending on application security and
performance needs it can be decided how much unencrypted cached data can be present.
To improve performance only complete DataChunks are cryptographically processed.
The size of DataChunks is matched to the capabilities of storage hardware (e.g. page
sizes) and to the capabilities of the encryption hardware (e.g. buffer size of cryptographic
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processor).
DataChunk Size The DataChunk size SD is determined by a number of factors. These
are:
\bullet Cryptographic Algorithm: The cryptographic algorithm usually operates on fixed
block sizes SB. The DataChunk size should therefore be aligned with this block
size. Thus, the DataChunk size SD must be a multiple of SB.
\bullet Cryptographic Hardware Support: If cryptographic hardware support is available
it is normally operating most efficiently on a block size of SC . The transfer of data
to and from the crypto processor has a fixed cost element (addressing, loading
operations, etc.) and a variable cost element that depends on the data size to be
processed. SC is a multiple of SB but in many practical setting SC = SB. Again,
SD must be a multiple of SC .
\bullet Flash Memory: Flash memory is organized in pages of size SP . Depending on the
flash memory hardware the page size implies different constraints. For example,
with some hardware it is only possible to read or write a whole page. Other
hardware allows to read or write parts of a page but writing or reading of complete
pages is most efficient (as the fixed cost of addressing has to be paid only once for all
data associated with the page). It is therefore reasonable to align the DataChunk
size with the page size. SP should be therefore a multiple of SD.
SP = aSD = bSB = bSC
b \equiv 0 (moda)
\forall a, b \epsilon 1N+
Data Caching To increase the performance of the system, unencrypted DataChunks are
cached. Write operations are cached and encryption is carried out after a certain number of
DataChunks are accumulated. Likewise, if previously stored data must be read/modified
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Figure 3.1: The Contiki Coffee File System (CFS)
the complete corresponding DataChunk is decrypted and cached. Increasing the size
of the cache leads to better performance; however, with this approach the amount of
unencrypted data present in the system would be bigger. Decreasing the size of the
cache leads to better security, but at this time the system performance decreases. The
number of unencrypted DataChunks ND allowed in the system at any given time is a
configuration parameter.
Key Management In the current implementation of our framework, encryption keys are
pre-shared. Future implementations might be enhanced with dynamic key-management
protocols such as Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [KHNE10].
3.1.3 Codo Implementation
Codo is implemented as an extension of Contiki's [DGV04] Coffee File System (CFS)
[TDZV09]. CFS organizes files as a collection of similar sized pages (see Figure 3.1) that
have generally the same size as the underlying flash memory pages2. For each new file,
2It is possible to map several Contiki file system pages into one flash memory page. However, this
only makes sense if the flash memory hardware is able to support operations on parts of a page.
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a header is created and a number of consecutive free pages are allocated. New data is
directly written to the empty pages in the file. If pages with existing content are modified,
a so called micro log file (also simply referred to as log file) is used. For modifications, a
micro log file is created and linked with the original file which contains a sequence of log
records that have the same size as a page in the original file. Each log record points to
the original page in the file and contains the updated information. If data is accessed,
the CFS checks first whether newer data is available in the log file before accessing the
original file. After a certain number of changes, the log file is filled and it is merged with
the original file to form a new consolidated file. The old file and micro log file are marked
for garbage collection to be recycled. The micro log structure is used as the flash memory
hardware does not allow us to overwrite pages directly. Before overwriting a hardware
page, it is necessary to format and clear an entire erase sector containing many pages.
This would be inefficient when used frequently and the use of a log file reduces erase sector
formats to a minimum performed at convenient times by the CFS garbage collection.
The CFS exposes standard functions such as cfs open(), cfs write(), cfs read(),
cfs seek() and cfs close() to the application for interaction with the file system.
3.1.3.1 CFS Optimisation
Codo makes use of the micro log as cache structure to hold unencrypted data. Thus,
every read and write call involves the micro log structure and therefore it is important
that it is performing efficiently.
Figure 3.2 shows the measured execution times of 10 consecutive cfs write() using
16byte blocks, a log record size of 256byte and a log file size of 4 records. CFS APP
shows the execution time of CFS when appending to a file. In this case the microlog
structure is bypassed and data is written directly to the file in the flash. CFS MOD
shows the execution time when writing to a file that has been modified at some point;
in this case the log structure is used and execution times are significantly higher (13.5
times higher for the first write operation). With CFS MOD it is checked if a log record
for the page that data is written to exists already in the micro log file. If this is the
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Opt. CFS_MOD + RAM
Figure 3.2: Execution time for sequential writes of 16byte blocks to CFS using a log record size
of 256byte.
case the existing log record is read and then merged with the new data that should be
written and the result is placed into a new log record in the micro log file. Obviously,
when using a large log record size (e.g. 256byte) and writing small amounts of data (e.g.
16byte) large portions of log records remain unused. Furthermore, copying data from an
existing log record to a new log record is time consuming. Finally, frequent costly merge
operations are necessary as the log file fills quickly (merging is executed with writes 5
and 9 in the example).
To improve log file efficiency we optimised its execution and modified its behaviour
slightly. If data has to be written to a log file but existing data in an existing log record
does not have to be overwritten, the new data is simply added to the existing log record.
This CFS optimisation is possible if the flash memory hardware allows partial writes to
memory pages. The optimisation results in a significant performance gain (now the first
write is 5.7 times more costly than CFS APP).
In a final optimisation step, we place the log file structure in RAM rather than in the
flash memory. This results in further improvements as can be seen in Figure 3.2 and write
operations involving the log file structure are of comparable speed to direct flash write
operations (The first write is now only 1.3 times more costly than CFS APP). Using
RAM for the log file structure is not without problems. Data loss is possible in case of a
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Algorithm 1 A simple Contiki application program using CFS with and without Codo
extension.
[01] PROCESS THREAD(cfs test process, ev, data) \{ 
[02] PROCESS BEGIN();
[03] char buf[100];
[04] char *filename = ""msg file"";
[05] int fd; int n=0;
[06] fd = cfs open(filename, CFS READ);
[07] \#ifdef CFS CRYPT
[08] while(n!`sizeof(buf)) \{ 
[09] n+=cfs read(fd,buf+n, sizeof(buf)-n);
[10] if(n!`sizeof(buf))
[11] PROCESS WAIT UNTIL(ev == KEY READY);
[12] \} 
[13] \#else





power failure and some platforms may not have RAM to spare for cache placement.
The outlined file system optimisations lead also to improvements of similar scale for
read operations. We use the described optimised CFS variant for our Codo implementa-
tion.
3.1.3.2 Codo Extensions for CFS
To implement Codo with Contiki's CFS it is necessary to i) modify and extend function
calls provided by the existing CFS library and to ii) modify and extend the behavior of
internal CFS components. We detail these necessary modifications in the next paragraphs.
CFS Function Calls
Algorithm 1 shows a simple Contiki program that uses the CFS library. The definition
in line 7, 13 and 15 is used to switch the API semantic between CFS with Codo
(CFS CRYPT) and standard CFS.
Without CFS CRYPT a file is opened in line 6 using cfs open() for reading which
is indicated via the flag CFS READ. In line 14 cfs read() is used to read data from the
file. cfs close() (line 16) is used to close the open file.
With CFS CRYPT, if data to be read using cfs read() (line 9) is not yet available
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in the micro log file (which acts as cache holding unencrypted DataChunks), the security
manager component (see next section for details) is triggered to fetch the key required
to decrypt the next DataChunk. The program leaves cfs read() before completion
of the read process and blocks on ev == KEY READY. When the key is obtained by the
security manager, it sends a signal to the waiting application process. When cfs read()
is now called again it will be able to decrypt the next data for which a key is now
present. Multiple executions of cfs read() with following PROCESS WAIT UNTIL may
be necessary to complete one read as a sequence of different keys may be required.
The call to cfs read() with following PROCESS WAIT UNTIL (line 8 to line 12) can be
combined within one C macro to hide the complexity of multiple function entries from
the programmer.
cfs write() is used in a similar way to cfs read().
cfs open() supports the additional flag CFS NO CRYPT to indicate that a specific
newly opened file should not be encrypted. Thus, the file system can hold encrypted and
unencrypted files at the same time.
We add also two additional functions to the CFS API: cfs read crypt() and
cfs write crypt(). These two functions can be used to read and write the encrypted
data directly. If data is still in unencrypted form in the cache cfs read crypt() will
perform encryption of the data. The security manager may have to be informed to fetch
necessary keys and multiple calls to cfs read crypt() followed by PROCESS WAIT UNTIL
might be necessary. These two functions are particularly useful for situations in which an
encrypted file must be transported over the network to the sink or another sensor node.
With these functions it is possible to avoid re-encryption of data for data transport and
the already securely stored data can be directly placed in network packets.
We provide a cfs merge(), which can be used to execute the processing costly merge
of file and log file at a convenient time (for example, at times the system is idle).
cfs close() is modified to ensure that a merge is executed to ensure that all
unencrypted cached data is encrypted and stored in the file. cfs close() may require
multiple function calls with PROCESS WAIT UNTIL as keys may have to be organized by
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the security manager for encryption.
CFS Components
Micro Log As described, the CFS uses the micro log files to handle flash memory
read/write specifics. For the Codo implementation we modify the log file such that it
becomes in addition a cache holding unencrypted DataChunks. In the standard CFS,
the log file is used for modifying write operations. In our CFS extension, read and initial
write operations also operate on the log file.
Whenever data is read from the file, it is first checked if the data is present in
unencrypted form in the log file. If not, the key associated with the data is requested
via the security manager component and, upon obtaining the key, the data is decrypted
and transferred to the log file. New data is always written to the log file. When the
maximum size of the log file is reached, the log file must be cleared and merged with the
original file.
Security Manager The security manager is implemented as a Contiki thread that is
responsible for i) generating new keys if needed ii) communicating with the sink to store
and retrieve keys. The security manager has room to store exactly one key, which may
be lost when a node is captured by an attacker. Keys are exchanged between sink and
nodes using public key cryptography.
The CFS can ask the security manager via a function call for a key to a specific
DataChunk of a file. This request contains three parameters: file id, DataChunk id and
flags. file id is the filename which is a unique identifier, DataChunk id is the number
of the DataChunk for which a key is required. flags indicates if the requested key is for
a portion of the file that has never been used before. If this is the case, the security
manager has two options. First, it can create the requested key, inform the file system
and then transmit the key to the sink for storage. Second, it can send a request to the
sink for a new key and, when a response arrives, inform the file system. If flags indicate
that a key for a previously used DataChunk is needed the security manager must send a
request for the key to the sink.
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Cryptographic Functions For encryption/decryption we use AES in Counter (CTR)
mode with 128bit key length provided by either by hardware (e.g. via the CC2420 radio
chip present on many sensor node platforms) or the open source MIRACL [Cer] library
if hardware support is not available.
3.1.4 Codo Evaluation
We evaluate the Codo implementation based on Contiki's CFS using a Tmote Sky sensor
node. To evaluate system performance we analyse the execution times of the CFS
function calls. Execution times are important indicators as they are a measure for system
responsiveness and are directly proportional to a node's energy consumption. We use the
CFS optimisations described in Section 3.1.3 and investigate performance with the log
file residing in flash memory and RAM.
The cryptographic hardware support of the Tmote's CC2420 radio chip requires a
minimum block size of SC = 16byte. The Tmote provides an ST M25P80 flash memory
with a page size of SP = 256byte. We therefore select a DataChunk size of SD = 256byte
to obtain a well matched system (see Section 3.1). For encryption/decryption we use
AES in counter mode (CTR) with 128bit key length provided by either the CC2420 radio
chip (CFS CRYPT HW) or the open source MIRACL [Cer] library (CFS CRYPT SW).
The file system is set to use a log record size of SL = 256byte to match flash memory
page size. Furthermore, the system is configured to use NL = 4 log records which means
that SL \cdot NL = 1024byte of unencrypted data can be present on the system at any given
point in time.
3.1.4.1 cfs write() Performance
In this first experiment, a file of size 2048byte is written using a sequence of cfs write()
calls. With each cfs write() call SW bytes are written to the file system (SW \in 
\{ 16, 32, 64, 256\} ). The execution time of each cfs write() call is measured. The
experiments are repeated using the original CFS in append mode (CFS APP), the original
CFS in modify mode (CFS MOD) (data is appended, but the file is assumed to be modified
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Figure 3.3: Writing of 2048byte in blocks of 256byte, 64byte, 32byte and 16byte using
cfs write().
and therefore the log file is also used), Codo CFS with software (CFS CRYPT SW) and
hardware supported (CFS CRYPT HW) encryption and Codo CFS with additional RAM
supported log file (CFS CRYPT SW M and CFS CRYPT HW M). In this experiment,
the Security Manager holds all 8 required keys for the 2048byte sized file locally and
a performance penalty due to a key exchange protocol is not observed. If keys are
exchanged over the network, key exchange times have to be added to the experimental
results.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 3.3. Using CFS APP and SW = 256byte
the time to write all 2048byte to the file system is 18.3ms. In this mode, the file system
does not make use of the log file structure and data is directly written to the file structure
in flash memory. With CFS MOD the time increases significantly to 54.8ms as the
log file structure is involved in the writing process. Each write is directed to a log
record in the log file in flash memory, and when all log records are filled a merge is
executed to integrate log file and original file. CFS CRYPT SW and CFS CRYPT HW
are functionally identical to CFS MOD but when the log file is merged with the original
file, encryption has to be performed. Thus, with CFS CRYPT SW and CFS CRYPT HW
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write CFS APP CFS CRYPT SW CFS CRYPT HW CFS CRYPT HW M
1 2.29ms 4.06ms 4.12ms 1.43ms
2 2.29ms 3.14ms 3.17ms 1.40ms
3 2.29ms 2.93ms 3.02ms 1.40ms
4 2.29ms 2.93ms 2.93ms 1.37ms
5 2.29ms 168.67ms 90.39ms 63.45ms
6 2.29ms 3.14ms 3.14ms 1.40ms
7 2.29ms 2.99ms 2.96ms 1.37ms
8 2.29ms 2.93ms 2.96ms 1.37ms
Table 3.1: Writing of 2048byte in 8 blocks of 256byte.
execution times are 190.8ms and 112.7ms. With RAM caching, execution time reduces
further to 151.6ms and 73.2ms (CFS CRYPT SW M and CFS CRYPT HW M).
The overall time of writing 2048byte to the file is not distributed equally among the
8 separate executions of cfs write() with SW = 256byte (see Table 3.1). The first
cfs write() takes for CFS CRYPT SW and CFS CRYPT HW slightly more time than
the following three as time to create the log file structure in flash memory is needed.
The 5th write takes considerably more time than previous writes as the log file of size
NL = 4 is full and a merge must be executed before a log record can be written. During
merge, encryption is performed, which takes significant processing time. The use of
encryption hardware support improves encryption performance by 47\%. When using
CFS CRYPT HW M, the first 4 write operations are faster then CFS APP as data is
written to the cache located in RAM.
When decreasing the write size SW to 64bytes, 32bytes and finally 16bytes the overall
time necessary to write the file of 2048bytes increases (see Figure 3.3). This is not
surprising as each cfs write() call is associated with additional overhead. For example,
the overall time necessary to write file of 2048bytes length increases from 112.7ms to
211.6ms to when switching from SW = 256byte to SW = 16byte with CFS CRYPT HW.
It has to be noted that CFS CRYPT HW M outperforms CFS MOD for SW = 16byte.
This means that under this condition Codo, which performs caching and encryption,
outperforms the standard CFS when operating on files that have been modified.
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Figure 3.4: Reading of 2048byte in blocks of 256byte, 64byte, 32byte and 16byte using
cfs read().
Summary Codo CFS is relatively expensive in comparison to CFS. However, CFS
does not provide data confidentiality and this feature cannot be implemented at zero
cost. For example, overall execution time for writing SW = 256byte increases with Codo
CFS (CFS CRYPT HW M) compared to CFS (CFS APP) by a factor of 4. However,
individual write operations that do not require merging and encryption are faster with
Codo (CFS CRYPT HW M) (By a factor of 1.6 for the first write with SW = 256byte).
Furthermore, within an application scenario, it might be possible to schedule costly merge
and encrypt operations at times the system is idle and, thus, overheads for providing
confidentiality may not impact overall system performance.
3.1.4.2 cfs read() Performance
In this second experiment, the file created in the previous experiment (2048byte file
size) is read using a sequence of cfs read() calls. With each cfs read() call, SW
bytes are read from the file system (SW \in \{ 16, 32, 64, 256\} ). The execution time of each
cfs read() call is measured. The time necessary for reading the complete file is shown
for all file system modes in Figure 3.4.
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read CFS APP CFS CRYPT SW CFS CRYPT HW CFS CRYPT HW M
1 3.14ms 232.03ms 134.31ms 100.56ms
2 3.11ms 38.24ms 18.77ms 15.66ms
3 3.17ms 38.36ms 18.80ms 15.66ms
4 3.11ms 38.30ms 18.86ms 15.69ms
5 3.17ms 231.45ms 133.88ms 100.22ms
6 3.11ms 38.24ms 18.77ms 15.63ms
7 3.11ms 38.30ms 18.83ms 15.66ms
8 3.14ms 38.33ms 18.86ms 15.78ms
Table 3.2: Reading of 2048byte in 8 blocks of 256byte.
Using CFS APP and SW = 256byte the time to read all 2048byte is 25.1ms.
With CFS MOD the time increases to 30.6ms. With CFS CRYPT SW and
CFS CRYPT HW execution times are 693.2ms and 381.1ms; with CFS CRYPT SW M
and CFS CRYPT HW M times are 608.8ms and 295.1ms. Again, the overall time
of reading 2048byte to the file is not distributed equally among the 8 separate exe-
cutions of cfs read() with SW = 256byte (see Table 3.2). The first cfs read() of
CFS CRYPT SW, CFS CRYPT HW and CFS CRYPT HW M requires a merge as this
first read is performed after the previous experiment in which the file was written and
the log file structure was filled. Also the 5th read requires a merge as the log file is filled.
All 8 reads require reading from the flash memory followed by decryption followed by
placing of the decrypted data in the log file structure.
When decreasing the read size SW to 64bytes, 32bytes and finally 16bytes the overall
time necessary to read the file of 2048bytes increases as shown in Figure 3.4. However,
the times necessary for individual cfs read() calls have an uneven distribution. For
example, for SW = 16byte with CFS CRYPT HW M the first read requires 99.8ms as it
includes a merge, decryption of 256byte of data and placement of this data in the cache
(the log file). The next 15 read operations require 0.5ms each as the decrypted data is
now available in the cache. The 16th operation requires 14.8ms as a new block of 256byte
is decrypted and moved to the cache.
Summary Reading a securely stored file requires considerable more effort than reading
the file from the original CFS. For example, the overall time to read a 2048byte file
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in 256byte blocks with CFS CRYPT HW M increases by a factor of 11.7. However,
not every read operation is equally expensive. For example, when using a read size of
SW = 16byte with CFS CRYPT HW M read operations increase by a factor of 1.3; only
when merge and/or decryption operations are necessary read operations are much more
costly.
3.1.4.3 Cache Performance
Instead of using Codo, which enables caching of unencrypted data, one could
use a simple solution (CFS SIMPLE), which encrypts/decrypts data before calling
cfs write()/cfs read() of the original Contiki file system. CFS SIMPLE would
only be usable if it is ensured that data is accessed in whole blocks that can be en-
crypted/decrypted in full. Hence, CFS SIMPLE is only useful to provide a baseline for
comparison here but it is not a practically usable alternative.
Writing 256bytes of data using CFS SIMPLE HW takes 11.7ms (9.4ms for hardware
supported encryption and 2.3ms for writing to flash memory) when writing to a file that
has not been modified yet and hence the log file structure is not in use. In comparison,
CFS CRYPT HW M requires only 1.4ms as the data is written to the cache in RAM. A
performance penalty only occurs for writes when the log file structure is full and a merge
has to be performed (see previous paragraphs).
We note a similar performance difference for read operations. CFS SIMPLE HW
requires 12.5ms while CFS CRYPT HW M requires only 1.4ms if the data is found in
the cache structure.
The performance difference between CFS SIMPLE HW and CFS CRYPT HW M
diminishes when handling smaller amounts of data in each read and write operation. This
is due to the fact that then encryption/decryption times are comparable to times necessary
for flash read/write operations. For example, when writing 16bytes CFS SIMPLE HW
requires 1.2ms while CFS CRYPT HW M requires 0.6ms.
Summary The caching functionality provides a performance benefit for individual
read and write operations. Sensor network applications that access files sequentially
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(e.g. writing a continuous log file) may benefit from the increased read/write speed
effective for most operations. However, applications that really benefit from the cache
functionality are applications that access the same data in a file multiple times. For
example, some applications may record sensor data and then perform periodically complex
data processing which requires multiple reads of the previously recorded data.
Following from this work, Codo is combined with secure communication in WSNs, more
specifically in Internet of Things (IoT). This new mechanism will be explained in the
next section.
3.2 Combined Storage and Communication for Internet of
Things
The IoT is becoming a reality and vast numbers of smart objects are interconnected via
the Internet Protocol (IP). A number of applications in this context handle sensitive
information. For example, smart objects may be used for patient monitoring in hospitals,
implementations of security systems in airports or to monitor crucial business processes
in factories. Thus, security mechanisms are required to ensure confidentiality, integrity
and authenticity of the collected information.
Due to resource limitations of smart objects it is not feasible to use the existing IP
protocol throughout the entire IoT. IP header compression, as defined in the IPv6 Over
Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [MKHC07] framework, is used
in wireless IEEE 802.15.4 networks which smart objects generally use for interconnectivity.
6LoWPAN header compression and decompression is carried out by gateway nodes
when relaying packets between IEEE 802.15.4 networks and the existing IP network
infrastructure.
As the IoT relies on the established and tested IP protocol it is reasonable to also
use security mechanisms defined in this context. The Internet Protocol Security (IPsec)
[SK05] framework defines security mechanisms for IP networks and it is supported by
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Figure 3.5: A: Traditional Operation: 1 - Data is requested from the node. 2 - The application
forwards the request to the file system. 3 - The data is decrypted and passed to the
application. 4 - The application sends data for transmission to the IP stack which
secures the data. 5 - The data is transmitted.
B: Combined Secure Storage and Communication: 1 - Data is requested from
the node. 2 - The application forwards the request to the file system. 3 - The
secured data is directly passed into the IP stack. 4 - Data is transmitted without
cryptographic processing.
nearly all hosts currently in use. A definition of IPsec 6LoWPAN extensions [RDH+12]
exists which allows smart objects to participate in IPsec secured communication. Thus,
secure communication in the IoT using standardised mechanisms is feasible.
Smart objects now provide vast amounts of storage space due to the recent advances
in flash memory technology. IoT applications rely on this storage space in order to
improve system performance [TD11]. It is therefore becoming more important to not
only secure communication but also to protect sensitive data while it is stored on smart
objects. Various secure storage solutions exist that can be used to protect data on nodes.
The previously outlined secure communication and storage solutions have been
developed individually. It is not taken into account that tasks such as key exchange
or cryptographic processing are executed for both system components. Thus, in many
situations, cryptographic work performed by smart objects is unnecessarily carried out
twice or more. Given that smart objects are very resource limited devices it is desirable
to prevent such process duplication. Freed resources may be used to reduce hardware
complexity, improve energy consumption or to add additional application features.
We address the previously outlined shortcoming of existing solutions and provide
a design of a combined secure storage and communication framework that allows us
to reduce security related processing on smart objects (see Fig 3.5). In particular, we
consider the IP, 6LoWPAN and IPsec standards as the base for our work. We believe that
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a standard compliant solution is more desirable than a proprietary system. Furthermore,
it is safer to build on tested and trusted security mechanisms rather than designing an
entirely novel mechanisms. Data is stored securely on the flash file system such that it
can be directly used for secure transmission. This is not a trivial task as packet header
content of future transmissions must be considered when securing data for storage. We
show in this work that an IP-based combined secure storage and communication solution
is possible and that this can save up to 71\% of a node's security related processing effort.
A cost in regards to additional storage space is incurred as a result of the secure storage;
however, given that smart objects can now provide ample amounts of storage space we
do not see this as limiting factor. The specific contributions of this work are:
\bullet The definition of a framework for combined secure storage and communication for
IP/6LoWPAN networks.
\bullet An implementation of the framework for the Contiki operating system.
\bullet A detailed evaluation of the performance gains of the framework.
3.2.1 The Secure Storage and Communication Framework
Our proposed secure storage and communication framework is based on the established
IPv6/6LoWPAN protocols. IPv6/6LoWPAN defines IPsec/ESP (Encapsulating Security
Payload) that provides encryption and authentication of transmitted data packets. We
use the same cryptographic methods and data formats defined by ESP for data processing
before storage. This requires us to store not only data but also all header information
that is involved in the cryptographic processing. Encrypted data must be stored in ESP
compatible form such that requested data can be transmitted over the network without
further cryptographic processing. This requires us to anticipate content of communication
protocol header fields such as IP destination addresses, sequence numbers and checksums
at storage time. As IPsec is the base for communication and storage, the existing key
exchange mechanisms defined for IPsec can be reused for the storage element of the
framework.
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The next subsection describes IPsec/ESP usage in 6LoWPAN networks. This repre-
sents the communication element of our framework. More detailed information about
6LoWPAN and IPsec/ESP are given in Chapter 2. Thereafter follows a description of
the storage element of the framework. We then briefly discuss application layer protocols
that may be used with the framework and describe our Contiki-based implementation.
Finally we discuss expected performance gains and cost in terms of storage overhead and
provide a security analysis.
3.2.1.1 Communication Component
IPv6 uses IPsec [SK05] to secure IP communication between two end points. IPsec
is a collection of protocols that include Authentication Header (AH), which provides
authentication services, and ESP, which provides both authentication and privacy services.
A suite of encryption and authentication algorithms are also defined. A node keeps track
of Security Associations (SA) that specify how IP flows are treated in terms of security.
Each SA holds a Security Parameter Index (SPI), which is a 32-bit value used by a
receiver to identify the correct SA.
In an ESP [Ken05] packet data (for example, a UDP packet), padding, pad length
and next header information are encrypted. All header information may be authenticated
using the optional Integrity Check Value (ICV). In an 802.15.4 network an ESP header
will not be transmitted directly. Its compressed form as defined by 6LoWPAN is used
instead to reduce header overheads.
6LoWPAN defines header-compression mechanisms. LOWPAN IPHC is used for
IP header compression and LOWPAN NHC for the next-header compression. The NH
field in LOWPAN IPHC when set to 1 indicates that the next header following the
compressed IPv6 header is encoded with LOWPAN NHC. LOWPAN NHC has a length
of 1 or more octets, where the first variable length bits identify the next header type
and the remaining bits are used to encode header information. Currently, 6LoWPAN
defines LOWPAN NHC for the IP extension header (LOWPAN NHC EH) and the UDP
header (LOWPAN NHC UDP). A definition for ESP encoding (LOWPAN NHC ESP) is
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Pad Length Next Header
Figure 3.6: A compressed and ESP secured IPv6/UDP packet.
provided in [RDH+12].
Figure 3.6 shows a UDP/IP packet secured with compressed ESP. An Initialization
Vector (IV) may be carried in the ESP packet if the selected encryption algorithm requires
transmission of this information with every packet. The shaded portion represents
encrypted data. Authentication can be provided using the ICV.
3.2.1.2 Storage Component
Data is stored securely such that it can be transmitted as ESP compliant packets
on request without additional cryptographic processing. This requires storage of all
cryptographically processed elements of the ESP packet within the file system. ESP
header elements that are not cryptographically processed and can be constructed with
little effort when data is requested and therefore do not have to be stored.
Data is stored as blocks representing the shaded part (and the ICV if authentication
is required) shown in Figure 3.6. If data stored within a block is requested the block is
read from the file system and the full packet, as shown in Figure 3.6, is assembled and
transmitted. The receiver may only be interested in part of the received data and some
undesirable transmission overhead may occur. However, typical applications will require
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bulk data transfer (large parts of a file) in which case such overheads do not occur. For
example, for further data analysis an application may request recorded sensor samples
within a particular time frame or, for performance debugging purposes, recorded link
quality metrics over a longer time period may be requested.
Some stored information is dependent on the communication relationship. At the
time of storage, assumptions regarding the forthcoming communication relationship must
be made in order to enable cryptographic processing. Elements to be considered are:
\bullet UDP Header: A UDP header is stored within the encrypted ESP payload. Assump-
tions regarding destination and source UDP port must be made at time of storage.
The destination IP address of packets is used within the IPv6 UDP checksum
calculation. Thus, IP source and destination address assumptions must be made as
well.
\bullet Initialization Vector (IV): The IV (if required) is used for ESP encryption. Most
protocols allow a counter mode where the IV for each packet is constructed by
adding a transmission sequence number to an initial IV.
\bullet Sequence Number (SN): The ESP header includes a sequence number. This
sequence number is not encrypted but it is included in the ICV calculation. If ESP
authentication is used a sequence number must be selected at time of storage in
order to generate a ICV for storage alongside the data.
UDP Header Construction: A UDP header has to be prepared at time of data storage.
The header consists of 4 fields of 2byte length: Source Port, Destination Port, Length
and Checksum.
The Length field is defined by the amount of data contained in the UDP packet. To
reduce packet overheads the amount of data contained in each UDP packet is selected
such that the maximum 802.15.4 frame size of 127byte is utilised.
The selection of a Source and Destination Port is not problematical. It can be assumed
that well known ports can be used for data retreival.
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The calculation of the Checksum field is challenging. The checksum is mandatory in
IPv6 and is calculated using a pseudo header. This pseudo header contains the IP Source
Address, the IP Destination Address, UDP Length and IP Next Header field. As the IP
Destination Address is included assumptions regarding the IP address requesting stored
information must be made. The checksum is calculated as the 16-bit one's complement
of the one's complement sum of the pseudo header, the UDP header, and the data.
It is a reasonable assumption that a particular host is used most of the time to request
information from nodes (e.g. the sink). The IP address of this node may be used for
storage preparation.
In some cases data may be requested from a different node and the IP destination
address used for checksum calculation does not match the destination of the data requestor.
In this situation it is possible to correct the checksum in a way that does not require
the decryption and encryption of all of the data again. Thus, performance is reduced as
part of the stored data must be cryptographically processed before transmission but it is
still beneficial in comparison with a system that does not combine secure storage and
transmission (see Section 3.2.2).
ESP can use encryption algorithms which operate on blocks (e.g. AES using 16byte
blocks). It is possible to decrypt only the first block of a larger stored ESP packet which
will contain the UDP header and its checksum. Since the UDP checksum algorithm is a
simple summation checksum re-calculation is trivial. By substituting the old destination
address for the new destination address, a new checksum can be calculated. Now the
first block of the ESP packet can be encrypted and it is ready for transmission to an
alternative destination.
IV Construction: The IV does not have to be stored in the file system together with
the encrypted ESP fields. An initial IV can be used and the storage block number is
added to construct the IV.
Sequence Number Construction: If authentication is required it is possible to also
store the ICV. As the ESP header includes a sequence number which is included in the
ICV calculation, it is necessary to predict at storage time what sequence numbers will be
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used during communication.
Data belonging to a file is stored as sequence of ESP encrypted blocks and we can
use the block number as ESP sequence number. IPsec allows us to reset the sequence
number counters at the start of a communication relationship by establishing a new SA.
Thereafter, data from the file can be delivered sequentially. In this setting we ensure that
the communication uses sequence numbers that were selected at time of data storage.
3.2.1.3 Framework Usage
Application Layer Protocol: Nodes store data securely which may be requested by Internet
hosts. Stored data has an application specific semantic. For example, sensor values may
be stored as a 4byte sensor value together with a 4byte timestamp and 2byte sequence
number. Nodes execute a storage application that is able to respond to queries such as
``send sensor samples recorded between 12:00:00 and 13:00:00"". A host executes a storage
application that is able to send these requests and to process arriving data. Host and
node storage applications use UDP for communication. Similar to the well known File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) protocol, separate flows are used for command and data transfer
which makes different IPsec security settings (including keys and security mechanisms)
for both channels possible.
Security Configuration: The IPsec SA defines how data flows are protected. The SA
holds secret keys, encryption algorithm descriptions and IP addresses to identify flows.
Each SA holds an SPI, which is a 32-bit value used by a receiver to identify the correct
SA.
If each file should be encrypted with a different key it is necessary to specify distinct
SAs that each use a unique SPI. The SPI is transmitted in the 6LoWPAN header in
compressed form (See Section 3.2.1.1). However, compression is only possible when
the default SPI value is used; otherwise SPI information must be carried within the
packet. Thus, the most frequently used file should use the default SPI in order to improve
efficiency. In a practical setting this is not an issue as most nodes are using a single large
file for storage of sensor data.
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3.2.1.4 Implementation
We implemented the outlined framework for the Contiki [DGV04] operating system. The
implementation uses Contiki's \mu IP stack with 6LoWPAN/IPsec extensions as defined
in [RDH+12] as the communication component. The storage component uses Contiki's
Coffee File System (CFS) [TDZV09] with Codo to provide file system security extensions.
The \mu IP stack was modified in order to enable direct passing of ESP encrypted packets
from the file system to the communication stack. On the host side we used a standard
Ubuntu Linux host.
For encryption/decryption we used AES in Counter (CTR) mode, with a 128bit key, in
either hardware (e.g. via the CC2420 radio chip present on many sensor node platforms)
or the MIRACL [Cer] library if hardware support is not available. If authentication
is required, AES-XCBC-MAC-96 is used to calculate the necessary ICV (provided via
cryptographic processor or the MIRACL library).
The maximum 802.15.4 payload is 127byte and the available MAC layer payload
size is 102byte. As seen in Figure 3.6, 7byte are required for the compressed 6LoWPAN
header, 12bytes are required for the compressed ESP header fields, 2bytes are required
for the ESP trailer fields, 12bytes are required for the ICV if it is used and 8bytes are
required for the UDP header. This leaves a maximum payload of 61byte. The AES
algorithm requires a minimum block size of 16byte. Thus, the maximum feasible amount
of data that can be stored per block before fragmentation must occur is 54byte. Storage
blocks contain 64byte of encrypted data (8byte encrypted elements of the UDP header,
2byte encrypted ESP trailer and 54byte payload). Other feasible payload sizes are 6,
22 and 38. To avoid padding, an application should align write operations with these
payload sizes.
At this point in time, our Contiki IPsec implementation does not support key exchange
mechanisms such as the IKE protocol. Keys are set manually before deployment. However,
for most application scenarios this would not be an issue limiting the framework's usability.
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3.2.1.5 Security Discussions
In this section we briefly discuss the security of the combined storage and communication
system. We consider key management, cryptographic algorithms, message encryption
and message authentication. In particular, we determine whether the combination of
secure storage and secure communication provides weaker security than systems treating
both subsystems individually.
Confidentiality - Communication is secured using IPsec's ESP procedures. The
solution does not deviate from procedures defined in the IPsec framework. An attacker
with access to the communication channel has access to the same information as an
attacker on any other ESP secured communication. If we consider IPsec a secure solution,
the provided solution can be considered secure as well.
Our implementation uses AES in CTR mode with 128bit keys. The best known
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) attack for this key length is four times better
than exhaustive search [BKR11], and does not adversely affect its security.
Integrity and Authentication - When authentication is required, the ICV is calculated
and appended to the ESP. Here we have to balance security and performance needs.
Storing the ICV along with the ESP will ensure data integrity and authentication for
storage and communication. However, when storing ICVs along with the encrypted
payload it is necessary to select sequence numbers at the time data is stored. Hence,
sequence numbers are predictable and will repeat when stored file content is transmitted
repeatedly. Thus, protection against replay attacks in the communication channel is
weakened. On the other hand, we will have performance gains as the ICV does not have
to be computed at transmission time. If we decide to calculate the ICV before each
transmission the replay protection is strongly enforced while the performance gains are
reduced and stored data is missing integrity and authentication data.
To provide both strong data integrity and relatively weaker anti-replay functionalies
when the ESP authentication field (ICV) is also stored in flash memory, sequence numbers
should be in order before calculating ICVs for all the stored packets in a file, and the
sender's and receiver's counter should be reset (by establishing a new SA) prior to the
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transmission of a file.
Storage - Data is stored in the same format as it is later transmitted. An attacker
with access to the file system has the same information available as an attacker with
access to the communication channel. If transmitted information secured using ESP is
considered to be secure then information stored in the file system must be considered
secure as well.
Key Management - Data in flash memory is secured using the same key that is later
used for communication. Hence, transmission of the same stored data requires usage of
the same key on the communication link. It is not possible to negotiate a fresh key for
each communication relationship compared to when IPsec is used on its own. However,
many practical IPsec deployments use pre-shared fixed keys so we consider this a secure
option.
Similarly, if multiple nodes have to be able to access the same stored information
they will also have to use the same key for communication. This is similar to practical
situations where IPsec is used with a single pre-shared key.
The proposed system has difficulties with revocation of keys; if a new key is selected
data already stored in the flash file system must be re-encrypted, which is costly on
resource constrained systems.
3.2.2 Evaluation
In this section we first discuss the costs in terms of storage overhead that are associated
with the proposed scheme of combined storage and communication. Thereafter we analyse
the processing performance and energy consumption gains associated with our scheme.
We use our Contiki implementation for the Telos B platform.
3.2.2.1 Storage Overheads
Storing encrypted data together with the ESP fields that demand cryptographic processing
requires additional storage space compared to a solution which would only store encrypted
data.
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Storing Encrypted Fields and ICV
Figure 3.7: Storage overheads for different payload sizes.
If only encryption is used an extra 10byte per stored data block is required. Thus, it is
better to store large blocks (large ESP packets) as this reduces the overhead. Figure 3.7
shows the overhead in dependency of the payload size. We show overheads for payload
sizes which align with the AES encryption block size of 16byte and that do not require
fragmentation when transmitted.
If authentication is also required then overheads increase as the ICV data of 12byte
has to be stored alongside the other encrypted information.
The results show that the proposed framework reduces the effective storage size of
the available flash storage space on nodes by 40.7\% when using a payload size of 54byte
and use of ICV. However, if we consider a common flash memory size of 16GB in which
a 10byte sensor reading is recorded every minute the time until the storage capacity is
exceeded is reduced from 3266years to 1329years. Both values are acceptable in any
deployment context and it can be concluded that the necessary storage overhead is not a
limiting factor of the proposed framework.
3.2.2.2 Performance Gains
The combined storage and communication framework provides performance improvements.
To analyse performance benefits in detail we use 4 different experiments. In all 4
experiments, ESP encryption and authentication is provided. The different experiments
are used to show increasing performance benefits with increasing integration of storage
and communication. Experiment A uses a system without the combining storage and
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communication. In these experiments (Experiment B, C, D) the framework is used in
different configurations.
Encryption Authentication UDP checksum re-calculation
Experiment A individual individual -
Experiment B combined individual not required
Experiment C combined individual required
Experiment D combined combined not required
Table 3.3: Experiment setup details used for evaluation. All experiments use ESP encryption
and authentication. The combined storage and communication framework is used
for different aspects. UDP checksum re-calculation is assumed in some settings.
Experiment A is the baseline experiment where data is read from flash memory, de-
crypted and re-encrypted for IPsec conformant transmission. In addition, authentication
is provided and an ESP ICV is constructed. In Experiment B, ESP encrypted fields are
stored in the flash memory and can be directly transmitted upon request. The ICV
for authentication is still constructed at transmission time. Experiment C differs from
Experiment B in terms of UDP checksum calculation. A non-matching IP address was
used at storage time and a re-calculated before transmission is necessary. In Experiment
D, ESP encrypted fields and the ESP authentication field (ICV) are stored in flash
memory and can be transmitted directly upon request. All of the experiments are carried
out with both software and hardware encryption. Table 3.3 summarises the experiment
settings.
Experiment A: Baseline experiment
In this experiment, data is read from a file and sent using conventional methods. ESP
conformant AES encryption is used for the storage component and communication
component to allow for comparison with the other experiments. Payload data is read in
blocks of 6, 22, 38 and 54bytes. The payload is decrypted and then re-encrypted for IPsec
transmission. ICV authentication data is constructed before transmission. Decryption is
carried out within the Contiki CFS; encryption and ICV calculation is carried out within
the Contiki \mu IP stack.
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(\bfb ) With hardware encryption.
Figure 3.8: Duration of different operations involved in preparing single packet for transmission
with software and hardware encryption.
Figure 3.8 shows the time that is necessary on a node to process one payload. The
processing time is measured from the start of the file system read operation to the
completion of the packet transmission. The total processing time is broken down to show
the contribution of significant individual operations:
\bullet CFS reading is the time required to read data from the file system.
\bullet CFS decryption represents the time necessary to perform data decryption.
\bullet ESP encryption represents the time necessary to encrypt the ESP payload.
\bullet ESP ICV calculation is the time required to produce authentication data.
\bullet Other operations summarises the duration of all other operations.
Figure 3.8a shows the processing duration breakdown when cryptographic processing
is carried out in software. The total time to prepare a single packet is 19.1ms, 25.2ms,
31.4ms and 37.6ms for 6byte, 22byte, 38byte and 54byte payload data, respectively. CFS
reading time is 8\%, CFS decryption time is 21.3\%, ESP encryption time is 21.5\% and
ESP ICV calculation time is 25.1\% of the overall processing time for 54byte payload.
Figure 3.8b shows the duration of operations when using hardware supported crypto-
graphic processing. Total times for preparing a single packet are 11.8ms, 14.5ms, 17.1ms
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(\bfb ) With hardware encryption.
Figure 3.9: Duration of different operations involved in preparing single packet for transmission
with software and hardware encryption when storing ESP encrypted fields.
and 19.7ms for the different payload sizes. CFS reading time is 15.1\%, CFS decryption
time is 12.5\%, ESP encryption time is 12.7\% and ESP ICV calculation time is 13.8\% of
the overall time when preparing 54byte of data.
Enabling hardware support improves performance by 38.1\%, 42.6\%, 45.5\% and 47.5\%
for 6byte, 22byte, 38byte and 54byte payloads, respectively.
The experiments show that when a 54byte payload is transmitted processing the node
spends 67.9\% of the preparation time on cryptographic processing (software supported).
This cryptographic processing time can be avoided by the proposed framework as we
show in the following experiments.
Experiment B: Storing ESP fields
In this experiment, ESP encrypted fields are stored in flash memory with the payload
data. 6, 22, 38 and 54byte payloads are used. As additional stored ESP fields are 10byte
length 16byte, 32byte, 48byte and 64byte must be read from the file system. Compared to
Experiment A CFS decryption and ESP encryption is now not necessary, so processing
time is saved.
Figure 3.9a shows the duration for different operations when preparing a single packet
for transmission with software encryption. Total times for preparing a single packet are
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12.5ms, 15ms, 17.6ms and 20.2ms; and improvements in system performance when it is
compared to the baseline experiment with software encryption are 34.6\%, 40.4\%, 43.9\%
and 46.3\%.
Figure 3.9b shows processing times when using hardware encryption. Total times
for preparing a single packet are 9.3ms, 10.7ms, 12.1ms and 13.5ms; and improvements
in system performance when it is compared to the baseline experiment with software
encryption are 51.3\%, 57.7\%, 61.6\% and 64.1\%.
It is notable that the CFS read time is less than in Experiment A even though more
data has to be read from the file system (e.g. instead of 54byte, 64byte are read as
ESP information is included). This is due to the fact that elements of the CFS can be
bypassed when directly reading encrypted data for transmission.
Experiment C: Using a non-matching IP address
This experiment is similar to Experiment B. The difference is the IP address of the
destination when carrying out ESP encryption for storage. The UDP checksum enclosed
in ESP packets must be corrected before transmission. The time necessary to perform
decryption of the 16byte block containing the checksum, its correction and encryption
of the 16byte block containing the corrected checksum is referred to as UDP checksum
preparation.
Figure 3.10a shows results using software encryption. The total time for preparing
a single packet is 15.3ms, 17.9ms, 20.4ms and 23ms; and improvements in system
performance when it is compared to the baseline experiment with software encryption
are 20.1\%, 29.1\%, 35.1\% and 38.9\% for the different payload sizes.
Figure 3.10b shows results when using cryptographic hardware support. Total times
are 10ms, 11.4ms, 12.8ms and 14.2ms; and improvements in system performance when
it is compared to the baseline experiment with software encryption are 47.6\%, 54.7\%,
59.2\% and 62.1\% for 6, 22, 38 and 54byte data.
The correction of the UDP checksum, which may be necessary in cases we cannot
anticipate the endpoint to which stored data must be delivered, is not very costly. For a
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(\bfb ) With hardware encryption.
Figure 3.10: Duration of different operations involved in preparing single packet for transmission
with software and hardware encryption when using a non-matching IP address.
54byte payload using hardware support the performance gain is only reduced from 64.1\%
to 62.1\%.
Experiment D: Storing ESP and ICV fields
In this experiment all options of the proposed framework are in use. Data is stored in
ESP compatible form alongside the ICV authentication data. In this case no encryption
processing is required when data is requested, and thus processing times are independent
from cryptographic algorithm implementations (hardware or software). The results are
shown in Figure 3.11a. For direct comparison we again show the results of Experiment A
(software encryption) in Figure 3.11b.
In this experiment, ESP encrypted fields and ESP authentication field (ICV) are
stored in flash memory together with the payload data. As encrypted fields have a length
of 10bytes and the authentication field (ICV) is 12bytes long, blocks of 28byte, 44byte,
60byte and 76byte have to be read for different payload sizes.
Compared to the previous two experiments, CFS read times increase as the additional
ICV has to be read. Total time for preparing a single packet is 8.1ms, 9.1ms, 10ms
and 10.9ms. Improvements in system performance when compared with the baseline
experiment with software encryption are 57.5\%, 64.1\%, 68.3\% and 71\% for 6, 22, 38 and
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(\bfb ) Individual security processing
Figure 3.11: Duration of different operations necessary to prepare a single packet for transmis-
sion when using the combined storage and communication framework and when
using individual storage and communication security solutions.
54byte payload data.
These results show that the proposed framework of combined storage and communi-
cation can achieve significant performance gains. When the framework is used, requested
data can be delivered approximately 3 times faster as cryptographic processing is not
required at the time when data is prepared for delivery.
3.2.2.3 Energy Consumption
We have shown that combining secure storage and communication reduces processing
time on sensor nodes. However, it is not immediately clear if savings in processing
time translate to energy savings as the proposed mechanism changes usage patterns of
hardware components such as flash memory and hardware encryption.
We therefore compare energy consumption of the conventional storage method with
our combined storage and communication method. We use the setups previously described
as Experiment A and Experiment B. We use energy consumption values for CC2420 radio
operations and ST M25P80 flash operations from the Tmote Sky datasheet [Sky06], and
for CC2420 hardware cryptographic support from [ZDC11].
If 54byte data is required to be stored and transmitted later using the conventional
method, 54byte data has to be encrypted and written to the flash memory for storage;
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54byte data has to be read from the flash memory and has to be decrypted; 64byte data
has to be encrypted in IPsec; 80byte data has to be authenticated in IPsec and the packet
has to be transmitted, respectively. In case that 54byte of data is required to be stored
and transmitted using combined storage and communication method, 64byte data has
to be encrypted and written to flash memory for storage; 64byte data has to be read
from the flash memory; 80byte of data has to be authenticated and the packet has to be
transmitted.
The system is able to skip two cryptographic operations when using combined secure
storage and communication. Therefore, the energy consumption decreases by 32.1\%,
even when additional 10byte have to be written to and read from flash memory. We
do not detail energy savings for all other experiment combinations as discussed in the
previous section. However, in all cases our proposed method leads to energy savings. In
the worst-case, energy consumption decreases by 18.7\% (in Experiment D with 6byte
data size).
3.3 Chapter Summary
In the first part of this chapter we present Codo, a novel framework for confidential data
storage on sensor nodes. We have described and evaluated a Codo implementation for
Contiki. As described, Codo addresses a number of shortcomings in existing secure storage
solutions. Codo matches hardware capabilities with security requirements; in-network
processing capabilities are preserved while providing confidentiality; already encrypted
data in the file system can be used directly for communication.
Codo uses AES with a 128 bit key length. Given this key length, the best known
AES attack is four times better than an exhaustive search [BKR11], which requires a
brute force attack with 2126 keys. This is considered infeasible within a reasonable time
frame and, thus, we consider Codo to be secure. Security requires a processing overhead
which is considerable. This processing overhead is proportional to the increase in energy
consumption of a node as the CPU is active for longer. However, the CPU is generally
the smallest energy consumer (radio and sensors consume far more energy) and the
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overall increase in energy consumption is reasonable given the added security. The exact
reduction of node lifetime depends on the particular CPU type and sensor platform used.
In the second part of this chapter, we have shown that combined secure storage and
communication can reduce security related real-time processing on nodes dramatically
(up to 71\% reduction). As shown, this can be achieved while decreasing as well a node's
power consumption (up to 32.1\%). Furthermore, we have shown that this is possible
within the context of the IP protocol family which we believe will be used in the future
IoT. The described solution requires additional storage space on nodes. However, we
believe that currently available flash memory sizes can absorb these overheads.
Data on nodes must be secured when stored and transported in order to implement a
comprehensive security solution. As resource-constrained embedded systems are limited
in resources it is necessary to find efficient solutions. As shown in this chapter, the
proposed framework combining security aspects of storage and communication can help
to achieve this goal.
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Node Identification Based on Clock
Skew
All clocks on Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) platforms experience a natural drift. This
drift is unique to a node as it depends on the clock hardware1. For example, the drift of a
node's real-time clock is defined by unique properties of the quartz crystal used. For most
WSN applications, clock drift is a nuisance and mechanisms such as time synchronisation
protocols are put into place to combat it. However, in this work, we take advantage of a
node's unique clock drift pattern and use it to uniquely identify nodes.
Besides other security requirements, it must be possible to authenticate nodes and
sensor data provided by them. For example, a sink node must be able to verify that
data is provided by genuine nodes and not by an adversary. Classical cryptographic
methods can be used to implement authentication. In this case, shared keys are used
to identify nodes. As keys may become compromised (i.e. someone obtaines a copy)
which would allow an adversary to impersonate a node, methods have been developed
which bind authentication to a node's hardware. For example, a crypto chip such as the
Atmel ATSHA204 [Atm12] can be included in a node's design which holds cryptographic
material for authentication. In this case an attacker must obtain the crypto chip in order
to impersonate a node. However, crypto chips are expensive and require an additional
1This chapter is based on the paper titled ``Node Identification Using Clock Skew"".
61
Chapter 4
component to be integrated in the node design. Thus, we use an already present hardware
characteristic to derive a unique node identification; we use a node's unique clock skew
characteristic for identification.
In addition to the outlined security application, clock-skew-based identification is
useful for other tasks. For example, when commissioning nodes, unique identifiers such
as node IDs and communication addresses must be determined. Clock skew can also be
used in this broader context to generate unique identifiers.
Clock skew has been previously used as means of node identification. For example,
Kohno et al. [KBC05] have shown that clock skew is unique and can be used to identify
classical PCs in the Internet. Uddin et al. [UC10] have shown that this method can
be used in principle in the context of WSNs. Existing work determines clock skew by
comparing clocks on separate nodes (or nodes and a sink). For this process, it is necessary
to distribute timestamps over the underlying communication network and a constant
network delay is required. In a WSN context, this is an impractical requirement as
duty-cycled communication induces large network delay variances.
In this part of the thesis we move away from this limitation of existing work and we
measure clock skew locally on nodes. We discuss how this can be achieved in general,
describe an implementation of this method and provide a detailed analysis describing
clock sampling requirements and achievable quality. More specifically, the contributions
of the work are:
\bullet Local Skew Determination: We describe how the clock skew of a node's crystal-based
real-time clock can be measured locally using the high-precision clock available on
modern transceivers to create unique node identifiers. An implementation of this
method for the Zolertia Z1 platform using Contiki is described.
\bullet Analysis of Sampling Requirements: The achievable quality of the local clock skew
determination is compared with the quality of state of the art distributed methods.
The dependency of clock sampling effort and skew calculation quality is analysed
in detail. In this context, it is also shown how clock sampling can be aligned with
general transceiver operation in order to avoid a transceiver duty cycle increase.
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Figure 4.1: Clock skew estimation.
4.1 Clock Skew
Clock skew could be determined by analysing the drift of a clock Cm with the help of
a stable reference clock Cr. However, in a practical setting, a stable reference clock is
generally not available and it is only possible to monitor one drifting clock with another
drifting clock. Hence, a measured clock skew value for a node reflects drift of the measured
clock and the used reference clock. Nevertheless, the determined clock skew value is
unique and dependent on the hardware characteristics of the clocks used.
4.1.1 Definition of Clock Skew
The measured clock Cm runs at frequency fs and the reference clock Cr runs at frequency
fr. To determine clock skew, timestamps of the measured clock and the reference clock
are taken periodically. Tm1 and T
r
1 are the first timestamps of both clocks taken at the
first sample point, Tmi and T
r
i are timestamps taken at the i
th sample point. The elapsed
time of the measured clock Cm at the i
th sample point is tmi = (T
m
i  - Tm1 )/fm; the




i  - T r1 )/fr. The offset -- the difference
between measured and reference clock -- at the ith sample point is oi = t
m
i  - tri . If we
sample N pairs of (tri , oi) for i \in \{ 1, ..., N\} and plot these pairs (the so called offset-set),
we obtain an approximately linear graph. It is possible to fit a linear function of the form
\delta \cdot trN + \varphi (4.1)
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to these obtained measurement points. The slope \delta of the fitted linear function is called
the clock skew. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the clock skew estimation.
4.1.2 Clock Skew Determination
There are a number of methods available to fit a linear function. Depending on the exact
method used the definition of clock skew is also slightly altered. In the literature mainly
two methods are used in the context of clock skew calculation which we detail next and
use in the remainder of the work.
4.1.2.1 Linear Programming
Moon et al. [MST99] have shown that clock skew can be accurately estimated from a
set of samples using a Linear Programming (LP) method. LP finds a line \delta \cdot tri + \varphi that
upper bounds the offset-set. The problem constraint of LP is given as
\delta \cdot tri + \varphi \geq oi (4.2)






(\delta \cdot tri + \varphi  - oi) (4.3)
LP delivers accurate results but has drawbacks when considering a WSN context.
Samples must be collected and stored before the calculation can begin. Furthermore,
a relatively complex solver for the LP must be available. If considering to execute the
calculation on a resource constrained node storage and calculation requirements may be
too excessive.
4.1.2.2 Linear Regression
Mar\'oti et al. [MKSL04] estimate clock skew using a form of Linear Regression (LR) in
their Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol (FTSP). The algorithm uses the average
elapsed time at the reference clock tr and the average offset o up to the ith sample point.
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Then the skew is estimated by calculating:
\delta = (oi  - o)/(tri  - tr) (4.4)
For the FTSP 8 sample points are used to estimate the clock skew. We use this
algorithm with a varying number of sample points in order to have control over the
achievable quality of the skew estimation. Compared to LP the implementation is much
simpler and therefore more suitable for usage on resource constrained nodes.
4.1.3 Clock Skew Quality
In this work we aim to use clock skew to uniquely identify nodes. Hence it is important
that clock skew measurements on two nodes can be attributed to the individual nodes.
The collision probability (the likelihood that two nodes are seen as the same even though
they are different) should be as small as possible.
Clock skew measurement, for example using the previously described LP or LR
method, is subject to variation. Thus, as two nodes may have a skew values close to each
other, variance of the measured skew may make it hard to clearly attribute measurements
to individual nodes.
We use a t-test to compare the means of the measured clock skews of two nodes. The
t-test returns a test decision for the null hypothesis that the nodes are the same. The
alternative hypothesis is that the two nodes are not the same. The probability value
(p-value) returned by the t-test is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (two
nodes are the same) when the null hypothesis is true. Therefore, a small p-value indicates
that the means of clock skew measurements of two investigated nodes are unlikely to be
the same.
For the experimental evaluations described in later sections we use p-values to describe
quality of determined clock skew measurements.
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4.2 Remote Clock Skew Determination
In existing work (for example, [UC10] and [HTW+08]) measured clock Cm and reference
clock Cr are located on different nodes in the network. For example, the reference clock
is the real-time clock of the sink node and the measured clock is the real-time clock of
the node to be identified. This remote clock skew determination is carried out as a node
generally provides only one accurate clock in its default configuration which is suitable
for skew calculations.
4.2.1 The Impact of Network Jitter
As shown in Section 4.1, timestamps Tmi and T
r
i are the i
th sample taken at the same
point in time. When using remote clock skew determination Tmi is taken first and the
timestamp is transmitted via the network to the reference node which then takes the
corresponding timestamp T ri . Thus, T
r
i is taken \Delta i after the sample T
s
i . \Delta i is the
network delay associated with transmitting the ith timestamp of the measured clock.
The clock skew calculation as presented in Section 4.1 is still valid if the network delay is
constant (\Delta i = \Delta \forall i). Variations in \Delta i (network jitter) reduce the quality with which
the clock skew can be determined. In a practical WSN network jitter is high due to
the nature of duty-cycled communication. For example, when using a protocol such
as ContikiMAC [Dun11] the forwarding delay is dependent on when a sender transmit
request occurs relatively to the point in time when a receiver node enters its periodic
listen phase. Using standard ContikiMAC configuration settings, forwarding delays vary
between 0ms and 125ms (ContikiMAC uses channel check rate of 8Hz). This is too high
to measure the characteristics of clock skew.
Existing work uses remote clock skew determination in specific setups where nodes
are only one hop distance away and no duty cycling MAC protocols or significant
network traffic is present. In such a specific case network jitter is low and remote
skew determination is possible. However, in any practical setting this method has its
limitations.
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Figure 4.2: The measured clock skew using five Zolertia Z1 nodes with remote clock skew
determination. 5 observations are carried out using 2500 timestamp samples.
4.2.2 Experimental Evaluation
We use five Z1 nodes from Zolertia [Zol10] to carry out a baseline experiment using
remote clock skew determination. We use the results obtained in this experiment as
comparison for the local clock skew determination method we introduce later.
The Z1's external 32, 768Hz watch crystal is used for clock skew profiling. We label
the nodes from Node 1 to 5 and select Node 2 as the sink node. Nodes are one hop away
from a sink node and its external crystal clock is used as reference clock Cr. The nodes
run the Contiki operating system and use a NullMAC (no duty cycling MAC is present).
No other network traffic than the transmission of timestamps from the 4 measured nodes
is present in the network.
Timestamps Tmi are transmitted every 4s from the nodes to the sink. When the sink
node receives a timestamp Tmi it records the corresponding timestamp T
r
i . The total
transmitted packet count is 2500 for every node. We repeat this operation 5 times (5
observations) and estimate the clock skew for each node. The clock skew is estimated
using the previous described LP method. This calculation is carried out offline after
collection of all timestamp samples. The result is shown in Figure 4.2; clock skew is
shown in ""part per million"" (ppm).
Figure 4.2 shows that nodes can be clearly identified by measuring clock skew. The
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Node 1 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
Node 1 - 4.25E  - 06 3.19E  - 08 2.36E  - 08
Node 3 4.25E  - 06 - 3.91E  - 07 1.69E  - 07
Node 4 3.19E  - 08 3.91E  - 07 - 3.23E  - 03
Node 5 2.36E  - 08 1.69E  - 07 3.23E  - 03 -
Table 4.1: Obtained p-values describing how clearly nodes can be distinguished from each other
node. The smaller the value the more clearly nodes are distinguishable.
Node 1 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
1.14E  - 01 9.43E  - 01 4.49E  - 01 3.54E  - 01
Table 4.2: Obtained p-values when comparing a node with itself. Values are larger (2 magnitudes)
then the ones shown in Table 4.1.
clock skew is stable enough over several observations. For some nodes it is easier to
distinguish them (for example, Node 1 and Node 4 are clearly separate nodes), others
have skew values close together (for example, Node 4 and Node 5). However, even though
some nodes are close together measured skew values can be clearly attributed to nodes.
How clearly nodes can be identified as separate (the quality of the skew values) can be
expressed using the previously outlined t-test. Table 4.1 shows the results of this analysis.
To provide some means of judging p-values we provide Table 4.2. Here, the means of
the first two observations of a node are compared with the mean of the third and forth
observation of a node; effectively p-values are generated where a node is compared with
itself and values are generated that are not distinguishable. As it can be seen, worst case
p-values in Table 4.1 are two orders of magnitude lower then in Table 4.2. This indicates
that the investigated set of nodes in this experiment is clearly uniquely identifiable via
measured clock skews.
4.3 Local Clock Skew Determination
To overcome the previously outlined limitations of remote clock skew determination (i.e.
the need of a constant network delay), it would be beneficial to use two local clocks on a
node for skew determination.
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4.3.1 Local Clock Sources
Most sensor node platforms provide two clock sources, the crystal-based real-time clock
and a processor internal Digitally Controlled Oscillator (DCO). However, these two
available local clocks cannot be used for skew determination as the DCO clock has a
much lower precision then the real-time clock. Thus, no stable clock skew values can be
determined using this setting.
However, most node platforms have a radio transceiver chip which has internally a
high-precision clock which is necessary for timing of data transmissions. In most cases it
is possible to access this resource and use it within the platform for other purposes than
transmission and reception of data.
The Zolertia Z1 platform we use for our work provides an 8MHz clock within the
CC2420 radio transceiver. We use the same approach that Pettinato et al. [PWEV12]
used to make use of the clock source of the radio. The Clear Channel Assessment (CCA)
pin of the radio is alternatively configured to output the internal radio clock signal [Tex13].
We connect the radio CCA pin with the external timer sources pin (TBCLK) of the
MSP430 processor. This allows us to use the radio clock as alternative clock source. As
this clock is of better quality than the crystal-based Real-time Clock (RTC) it is now
possible to use these two clocks to determine locally on the node a stable clock skew
value.
4.3.2 Experimental Evaluation
In this experiment we use the same 5 Z1 nodes as used for the previously described
baseline experiment. The Z1's external 32, 768Hz watch crystal (the measured clock
Cm) is used again for clock skew profiling. The CC2420 radio clock source is used as
reference clock Cr. Obviously, all nodes have their individual transceiver clock and, thus,
for each node skew profile an individual reference clock is used. Timestamps Tmi and T
r
i
are collected with an interval of 1s. The results determined using the LP method are
shown in Figure 4.3.
As can be seen, nodes are clearly identifiable in terms of observed clock skew. The
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Figure 4.3: The measured clock skew using five Zolertia Z1 nodes with local clock skew deter-
mination. 5 observations are carried out using 600 timestamp samples.
skew values are different to the values obtained remotely as shown in Figure 4.2. This
has to be expected as different reference clocks are used.
The calculated p-values for the five nodes are shown in Table 4.3. As can be seen
here, p-values are several magnitudes lower compared to the remote skew determination.
This means that individual nodes can be distinguished much more clearly. It has to be
noted that this significant improvement is achieved even though fewer sample points (600
compared to 2500) are taken and a shorter sample durations (1s compared to 4s) are
used.
We conclude that the local clock skew determination is much better than remote clock
skew determination as nodes can be more clearly identified. The collision probability
(the likelihood that two nodes are seen as the same even though they are different) is
greatly reduced. This is an important factor for the design of security mechanisms.
4.3.3 Processing Optimisation
So far, we have used the LP method to determine clock skew. This method is useful
and provides sufficiently accurate results (as previously shown) for local and remote
clock skew determination. However, LP is too complex to execute directly on resource
constrained nodes. We therefore use the LR method which is computationally more
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Node 2, 1000 ms
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Node 3, 1000 ms
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(\bfa ) Clock skews using LP.






























Node 1, 1000 ms
Node 1, 125 ms
Node 1, 15.625 ms
Node 1, 7.8125 ms
Node 2, 1000 ms
Node 2, 125 ms
Node 2, 15.625 ms
Node 2, 7.8125 ms
Node 3, 1000 ms
Node 3, 125 ms
Node 3, 15.625 ms
Node 3, 7.8125 ms
Node 4, 1000 ms
Node 4, 125 ms
Node 4, 15.625 ms
Node 4, 7.8125 ms
Node 5, 1000 ms
Node 5, 125 ms
Node 5, 15.625 ms
Node 5, 7.8125 ms
(\bfb ) Clock skews using LR.
Figure 4.4: The measured clock skew of five Zolertia Z1 nodes with remote local clock skew
determination. 10 independent observations with 600 timestamp samples are used.
feasible. LR is expected to deliver results of lesser quality compared to the LP method. It
is therefore necessary to analyse if the quality of the results is still sufficient to distinguish
individual node clock skews.
Figure 4.4 shows a comparison of local skew determination using the LP and LR
skew calculation method (The figure also contains lines showing the effect of reducing the
sample period from 1s down to 7.8125ms; we discuss the effect of reduced sample period
in the next section). The corresponding p-values are given in Table 4.3. Interestingly,
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Method Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
Node1
LP - 1.30E  - 15 1.6E  - 24 8.13E  - 22 6.58E  - 19
LR - 1.92E  - 16 6.12E  - 25 1.74E  - 22 3.12E  - 19
Node2
LP 1.30E  - 15 - 1.63E  - 10 8.32E  - 21 1.21E  - 15
LR 1.92E  - 16 - 1.59E  - 11 8.79E  - 21 1.46E  - 16
Node3
LP 1.36E  - 24 1.63E  - 10 - 4.13E  - 20 8.29E  - 17
LR 6.12E  - 25 1.59E  - 11 - 7.01E  - 21 3.98E  - 17
Node4
LP 8.13E  - 22 8.32E  - 21 4.13E  - 20 - 2.03E  - 13
LR 1.74E  - 22 8.79E  - 21 7.01E  - 21 - 4.36E  - 14
Node5
LP 6.58E  - 19 1.21E  - 15 8.29E  - 17 2.03E  - 13 -
LR 3.12E  - 19 1.46E  - 16 3.98E  - 17 4.36E  - 14 -
Table 4.3: p-values using LP and LR with 10 observations, 600 samples, 1s sample period.
the LR method fares sightly better in terms of producing clearly distinguishable clock
skew values. This is contrary to what we would have expected. Clearly, LR therefore
represents a feasible option for clock skew calculation.
We have implemented the LR method of calculation for the Contiki operating system
(LP was executed in Matlab after data had been collected). The run-time complexity
of the LR algorithm is O(n). For the calculation of skew using 200 sample points an
execution time of 2.01ms is required which corresponds to an energy consumption of
0.027mJ .
4.3.4 Sampling Optimisation
So far we have demonstrated the feasibility of local clock skew determination using
relatively long sampling periods of 1s and and a relatively large sample size of 600
samples. It is beneficial to reduce as much as possible sample period and sample size.
Reducing the sample period and size allows for more energy-efficient operations and
enables us to obtain skew values faster. When reducing the sample period, less time
to observe skew is available and resolution of the used clocks can be a limiting factor.
When reducing the sample size less points are available to reduce variance of the obtained
result.
For local clock skew determination as presented in this work the transceiver clock
is required. This clock is only available if the transceiver chip is active. A duty-cycled
MAC protocol will aim to put the transceiver into an energy-efficient sleep state for as
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(\bfa ) Node 1 using a 7.8125ms sample period.

















(\bfb ) Node 1 using a 1s sample period.
Figure 4.5: Node 1 skew for different sample sizes and sample period of 7.8125ms and 1s.
long as possible and only wake the transceiver for short durations for transmissions and
receptions. If short sample periods are feasible it is possible to align communication and
clock sampling and no additional transceiver chip wake times must be introduced. For
example, many slotted MAC protocols have transceivers periodically on for durations of
10ms to facilitate reception or transmission.
The required sample size should be as small as possible as this would allow us to
obtain a skew measurement fast. If we assume that sample periods are aligned with
natural transceiver activity we still have to wait until the transceiver was used sufficiently
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Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5
Node 1 - 6.66E  - 10 6.14E  - 12 3.14E  - 16 3.37E  - 15
Node 2 6.66E  - 10 - 1.21E  - 04 3.25E  - 12 2.08E  - 12
Node 3 6.14E  - 12 1.21E  - 04 - 3.79E  - 12 1.92E  - 11
Node 4 3.14E  - 16 3.25E  - 12 3.79E  - 12 - 1.69E  - 09
Node 5 3.37E  - 15 2.08E  - 12 1.92E  - 11 1.69E  - 09 -
Table 4.4: p-values using LR with 10 observations, 200 samples, 7.8125ms sample period.
often before a skew measurement can be obtained.
We record 600 samples with four different sampling intervals: 1s, 125ms, 15.625ms
and 7.8125ms. These results are shown for 10 observations in Figure 4.4, using LP
and LR for analysis. Figure 4.5a and Figure 4.5b show changes in skew variance of 10
observations when modifying sample size and sample period.
It is clearly visible that skew variations experienced from one measurement to the
next are reduced when increasing sample period and/or sample size. The question is
what a feasible combination of sample size and sample period is. The answer will depend
on the application situation. However, generally it can be assumed that the shortest
feasible sampling period should be used as this helps in aligning sampling with general
transceiver activity. Then, the number of samples should be reduced up to a point a
sufficient quality (expressed as p-values) of skew calculation is ensured. For example, if
we assume that a sample period of 7.8125ms and a sample size of 200 is chosen, we obtain
p-values as shown in Table 4.4. These p-values are better than the p-values obtained via
remote skew determination. Thus, with these settings local skew detection can replace
remote skew detection without a loss in skew quality.
4.4 Chapter Summary
A node's unique clock skew can be used for node identification purposes. It is useful to
use this approach because node identification is bound to the hardware and no additional
components have to be incorporated in the node design. We have demonstrated that clock
skew can be determined reliably locally on nodes. Existing methods rely on jitter free
network communication which is unachievable in most practical WSN deployments. Thus,
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the presented work takes an important step towards practical clock skew identification.
We have shown that clock skew of a node's RTC can be determined locally using the
transceiver clock present in most WSN systems. We have shown that locally determined
skew values for nodes can be as unique and distinguishable as skew values determined in
a distributed fashion. A sample period of 7.8125ms and a sample size of 200 are sufficient
to determine clock skew locally with the same quality as a remote technique with a
sample period of 4s and a sample size of 2500. Also, the possible short sample period
of 7.8125ms allows us to take clock skew measurements during times the transciever
is active for communication. Additional transceiver active periods do not have to be
scheduled to achieve local clock skew determination.
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Tamper Detection and Node
Identification Based on Channel
State Information
A large number of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) systems are using Wi-Fi as a means of
communication [BKR15]1. Wi-Fi devices are now commonplace and are often deployed in
application scenarios with strict security requirements. For example, wireless devices are
often part of physical intrusion detection systems used to protect critical infrastructure.
Wireless surveillance cameras might be used within a physical intrusion detection system of
an airport. An attacker may aim to change the camera's area of observation. Transmitted
image data would still be cryptographically authenticated and tamper detection would
require the inspection of the visual data. An attacker may also obtain key material and
replace a node in the deployment to inject false observation data. For these reasons, it is
desirable to provide an additional layer of defence that is able to indicate node tampering.
In this work, we use wireless channel characteristics to achieve this.
Communication environment changes can be observed via changes in channel charac-
teristics and this effect can be exploited for security purposes. Previous work exploited
1This chapter is based on the papers titled ``Short Paper: Gathering Tamper Evidence in Wi-Fi
Networks Based on Channel State Information"" and ``Using Channel State Information for Tamper
Detection in the Internet of Things"".
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channel characteristics to detect location changes [ZFPK08] or message injection [JZL+13].
In this work, we use those characteristics to detect tamper events for each node. In
particular, and in contrast to existing work, we consider transmissions over a varying
number of spatial dimensions in multi-antenna configurations of 802.11n Wi-Fi systems
(see Section 2.1.6 for details), and propose a tamper detection algorithm that works in
practical deployments.
In 802.11n, the frame preamble on the physical layer is used to compute Channel
State Information (CSI) for each incoming packet. We use this measurement for tamper
detection. Moving or replacing a transmitter changes the observed channel characteristics,
which results in an increasing tamper-evidence value. For example, a high tamper-evidence
value may be used to dispatch security personal to check integrity of a device.
Unfortunately, not only tamper events lead to CSI fluctuations; modifications of the
communication environment have an impact too. In particular, movement of people in
the communication environment has a noticeable influence on the CSI. As we will show in
Section 5.2.1, tamper detection based on CSI analysis is generally possible but it is hard
to distinguish tamper events from natural changes in the communication environment.
Thus, it is difficult to construct a practical security system based on CSI analysis as a
high number of false positives and a low number of true positives are detected. Figure 5.1
illustrates this challenge. The changing CSI amplitude value over time for just one
subcarrier is shown. As can be seen, tamper events and environmental changes (in this
case a person walking between sender and receiver) manifest in very similar ways.
To address this problem we propose to analyse CSI values from a single transmission
simultaneously at multiple receivers to improve distinction of tamper and movement events.
A moving person is expected to have an impact on some but not all communication links
while a tamper event is noticeable at all receivers. We describe the necessary algorithms
for the proposed CSI tamper detection method using multiple receivers. We analyse the
tamper detection capability in practical deployments with varying intensity of people
movement.
In this part of the thesis, we describe algorithms for tracking CSI values of Wi-Fi
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Figure 5.1: Effects of environmental changes and tampering on CSI amplitude values of the 9th
subcarrier of the 2nd antenna. Environmental changes and tamper events have a
similar effect on CSI amplitude values.
transmissions and show how to compute the tamper-evidence value. In particular, we
account for 802.11n's varying number of used spatial streams, and analyse detection
capability in practical deployments. To extract CSI information from off-the-shelf
hardware, we use the Linux 802.11n CSI Tool [HHSW11]. No additional transmissions
or protocol modifications are necessary for tamper detection. The contributions of this
chapter are:
\bullet Tamper Detection: We describe a method for device-specific tamper detection based
on per packet 802.11n CSI. The method handles varying numbers of spatial streams;
a feature used in 802.11n which is not yet considered by previous work. We also
describe a tamper detection algorithm that can be used in practical deployments
using multiple receivers.
\bullet Detection Analysis: We demonstrate that device movements of just 1 cm and
hardware replacements are clearly detectable. We analyse the tamper detection
capability of the proposed method using realistic deployment environments. We
describe system capability in these environments in terms of achievable False
Positive Rate (FPR) and True Positive Rate (TPR).
\bullet Tamper Detection Implementation: We describe how the proposed algorithms can
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be put to action in practical deployments. We discuss their application in the
future WSNs.
5.1 Tamper Detection
We use CSI of 802.11n packets in this work. As explained in Section 2.1.6, CSI is the
estimation of the channel conditions and represented as MscR\times S . It gives the amplitude
changes and phase shifts for each subcarrier sc.
We analyse the characteristics of a wireless channel at the receiver using CSI to
detect tampering on the transmitter. CSI values changes with the transmitter location
or hardware changes. However, CSI is also affected by tamper-unrelated events, like
changes in the communication environment due to moving people. These changes have
to be addressed in order to reduce false alarms. In the case that transmitter uses spatial
multiplexing, each transmission might be sent with different number of spatial streams,
as it is explained in Section 2.1.6.1. Different spatial streams have different CSI values,
and this aspect has to be addressed during the design of a tamper detection mechanism.
We first show the feasibility of tamper detection based on CSI using a single receiver.
In this setting, number of spatial streams S may vary between one and the number of
transmission antennas T . Then we provide a more reliable tamper detection mechanism
for practical deployments using multiple receivers. The transmitter must send broadcast
packets in this setting, because the receivers use the same link for tamper detection. If
the transmitter sends the packets in broadcast mode (i.e., receiver agnostic) it only uses
one spatial stream. Nodes transmit periodic broadcast beacons which can be picked up
by multiple receivers for CSI-based tamper detection.
Using single receiver or multiple receivers for tamper detection requires slightly
different algorithms to be able to handle different number of spatial stream settings. We
will show these algorithms in the following subsections.
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5.1.1 Single Receiver Tamper Detection
In the single receiver tamper detection algorithm, receivers collect and store \tau CSI
measurements MscR\times S,i\in 1...\tau . These CSI measurements are collected while the transmitter
is in a tamper free state and will be used for comparison with newly received CSI
measurements MscR\times S,i>\tau . A distance metric is used as existing works show that such
algorithms work well in this context (see related work [PK07, ZFPK08]). If the distance
is above a certain threshold, the algorithm decides there is a tamper event and triggers
an alarm.
A transmitter with T antennas can choose from one to T spatial streams. We create
T different models Modm=1...T , because each model requires its own training for the
corresponding spatial stream setting. Additionally, each model has one to m spatial
streams. Therefore, we need to generate modelsModm=1...T,s=1...m for each spatial stream
s.
The algorithm uses only the amplitude information of a CSI measurement and omits
the phase information. The amplitude information is normalized by taking the Euclidean
norm of all values in dimensions sc and r. The Euclidean distance D im,s for a model
Modm,s is obtained by calculating the Euclidean distance between the stored \tau CSI
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D im,s can have outliers as shown in Section 5.2. We are applying sample-wise and
time-wise moving average filter to D im,s in order to remove the outliers. The sample-wise






for i \geq k
We take the time points ti when a packet arrives and the CSI of the packet is measured,
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tj\in (ti - tw,ti)
Djm,s for ti \geq tw
Finally, we take the time-wise moving average of all models Modm=1...T,s=1...m where
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The resulting value D ic is compared against a threshold to make a decision whether
there is a tampering or not. Here, we use the maximum and mean pair-wise distances
between all training CSIs MscR\times S,i\in 1...\tau for the threshold:
D\tau i,j =
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A further discussion about using those metrics, as well as applying the tamper
estimation to channel measurements is presented in the Evaluation section.
5.1.2 Multi-Receiver Tamper Detection
Here we provide a more reliable tamper detection mechanism for practical deployments
using multiple receivers. As the transmitters send their packets in broadcast mode in the
multi-receiver tamper detection, only one spatial stream is used (S = 1). Therefore, we
simplify the representation of the CSI matrices and use MscR when we are explaining the
multi-receiver tamper detection algorithm.
In the multi-receiver tamper detection algorithm, receivers collect and store \tau CSI
measurements MscR,i\in 1...\tau , as when using a single receiver. These CSI measurements are
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collected while the transmitter is in a tamper free state and will be used for comparison
with newly received CSI measurements MscR,i>\tau . A distance metric for comparison is
used again. If the distance is above a certain threshold, the algorithm decides there is a
tamper event and triggers an alarm.
We consider three distance algorithms this time: (i) Euclidean distance, (ii) Ma-
halanobis distance and (iii) Earth Mover's distance. The Euclidean distance gives the
distance between two points; in our case the distance of two CSI vectors. Mahalonobis
distance gives the distance between a point and a distribution, in our case the distance of
a new CSI vector and a distribution of \tau CSI vectors. And lastly, Earth Mover's distance
gives the distance between two distributions, in our case the distance of the distribution
of two CSI vectors.
The algorithm uses only the amplitude information of a CSI measurement and
omits the phase information. The amplitude information is normalized by taking the
Euclidean norm of all values in dimensions sc and r. Euclidean distance Di is obtained
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Similarly, we omit the phase information in MscR,i and use normalized amplitude
information when computing Mahalanobis and Earth Mover's distance. We omit the
details of Mahalanobis and Earth Mover's distance algorithms here as they are well
documented in the literature [Mah36, RTG00]. We show in the evaluation Section 5.2.2.1
that the simplest distance computation method (Euclidean distance) is sufficient and
that the more sophisticated methods of Mahalanobis and Earth Mover do not provide
significantly better results.
To decide if tampering occurred, we need to set a threshold \gamma . If Di is greater than \gamma 
the algorithm will detect tampering (qi = 1), and otherwise a tamper free state (qi = 0)
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is assumed:
qi =
\left\{     0 if Di < \gamma 1 if Di \geq \gamma 
As we will show in Section 5.2.1, when using one link (one receiver) to evaluate
tampering it is not possible to distinguish tamper situations and environmental changes.
Both events can push the distance value above the threshold. We will demonstrate this
effect in Section 5.2.2.1. To overcome this limitation, we aim to use multiple receivers for
CSI analysis. The assumption is that a tamper event will push the distance observed at
all receivers above the set threshold while a change in the environment will not result in
a sufficiently significant distance change at all receivers. We use an approach where a
majority vote is used (i.e. the distance is above the threshold at the majority of receivers
to declare tampering). Tampering with the transmitter device clearly must influence all
links and not just some.
Formally, the overall tampering decision Qi with qni being the tampering decision at
the individual receivers for a new received frame is:
Qi =









where N is the number of receivers. Here, the packet i must be received by all the
receivers for a decision to be made. This situation can occur in practice as the transmitted
beacon used for tamper detection may not be received at all stations.
5.1.2.1 Threshold Selection
The performance of the tamper detection largely depends on the selected threshold \gamma . If
the threshold is selected too high, some tamper events might be missed. If the threshold
is too low, the system is too sensitive and a large number of false detections may occur.
In this work, we consider 3 methods for threshold selection: (i) Maximum Distance, (ii)
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Equal Error Rate and (iii) Zero False Negative.
A simple and straightforward approach is to use the maximum distance of all captured
CSIs during the training phase MscR,i\in 1...\tau as the threshold:
D\tau i,j =
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This threshold works well when the environment is static, as we will show. However,
the algorithm does not provide good performance in terms of false alarms when the
environment is dynamic.
We use False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rate (FNR) and True Positive
Rate (TPR) metrics to assess the detection mechanism. False Positive (FP) occurs
when the algorithm falsely decides there is tampering but actually there is not, False
Negative (FN) occurs when the algorithm misses a true tampering, and True Positive (TP)
occurs when the algorithm catches a tamper situation. We can create a Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve by evaluating all possible thresholds. The ROC curve displays
the trade-off between FPR and TPR for a given system. A balanced threshold can be
found for a system by looking at the Equal Error Rate (EER). EER is the point where
FPR equals FNR on the ROC curve.
CSI data collected during a training phase can be used to calculate a ROC. The
threshold that gives the EER on the ROC curve, \gamma EER, can be used as a threshold. This
threshold gives a balanced result in terms of FPRs and TPRs. However, as we will show
in Section 5.2.2.2, \gamma EER is often too high. It gives very good FPR results, but at the same
time it causes very low TPRs. We thus need to decrease the threshold, and to this end we
propose to pick the maximum threshold where the ROC curve gives FNR = 0, \gamma FNR=0.
We will show in Section 5.2.2.2 that this threshold gives fair TPRs and, unfortunately,
provides FPR > 0. We propose to apply time-wise filtering to the overall decision to
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address this issue, which we detail next.
5.1.2.2 Time-Wise Filtering
We apply a time-wise filter to the overall decision Qi to reduce the FPRs. We consider
the points ti---when a packet i was received by all the receivers---and make a decision
over a window tw. The overall time-wise filtered decision Q
i,tw is considered tampered if
all individual decisions in the window tw were tampered:
Qi,tw =









tj\in (ti - tw,ti)
Qj = count(tj)
Note that time-wise filtering used here is different than time-wise moving average
filter used in single receiver tamper detection. We average distance measurements over a
window tw in the single receiver setting. Here, we apply the filtering to overall decision
instead of applying it to distance measurements, and also we do not average the results.
Although time-wise filtering helps to reduce the FPRs, it will also reduce the TPRs.
This is a trade-off that needs to be considered. Also, before a decision can be made, data
points covering a full window must be collected. This increases the time until a decision
can be made (tamper detection is delayed).
5.2 Evaluation
We first evaluate the tamper detection using a single receiver. We show that device
movement and device replacement can both be detected. But we also show that false
alarms can be triggered by changes in the environment instead of tampering. Then we
evaluate multi-receiver tamper detection, of which we propose to overcome false alarms
caused by environmental changes.
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Experiment 4 (r = 3, s = 3)
Figure 5.2: Amplitude CSI values for different experiments and antenna/stream combinations.
Warmer colors represents higher amplitude values. Events such as device move-
ment/replacement and environmental changes are visible.
5.2.1 Single Receiver Tamper Detection
For evaluation, we use as receiver an Intel 5300 Network Interface Card (NIC) (3 antennas)
which allows us to extract CSI measurements via the Linux 802.11n CSI Tool [HHSW11].
As sender, we use either an Intel 5300 NIC or an Apple Mac (3 antennas). Depending
on the transmitter decision, each packet is received encoded with up to three spatially
independent streams. In all experiments, the transmitter is set to send a packet once a
second.
In the first experiment (Experiment 1), we use an iMac as sender with an initial
distance of 1.5m between sender and receiver. After 15min we start to move the
transmitter by 1 cm; after 30min by 2 cm; after 44min by 3 cm; after 59min by 5 cm;
after 74min by 10 cm and finally after 88min by 100 cm. This experiment is to analyse
the detectability of device movement. In the second experiment (Experiment 2), we
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analyse detectability of device replacement. An Intel 5300 NIC is used as sender; the
distance is 240 cm between sender and receiver. After 10min the sender NIC is replaced
while not altering antenna positions. The third experiment (Experiment 3) is used to
analyse the impact of moving pedestrians. An iMac is used as sender with distance 1.5m
between sender and receiver. After 15min, 16min and 17min a person is moving slowly
through the communication path (taking about 10 s each time). In the last experiment
(Experiment 4), we leave an iMac sender at night transmitting over a distance of 4m.
This experiment serves as baseline without tampering or environmental changes.
Figure 5.2 gives a visual impression of the recorded CSI amplitude values for different
experiments for a subset of the overall CSI data. For example, Figure 5.2d shows 30 CSI
amplitude values for each incoming packet received at the third antenna r = 3 using
spatial stream s = 3 and being transmitted using S = 3 independent spatial streams.
Data for other antenna/stream combinations are not shown here but are later used in the
tamper detection mechanism. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, the different events within
the 4 experimental setups are clearly visible.
5.2.1.1 Experiment 1: Device Movement
As described in Section 5.1.1, we use individual models for each spatial stream setting to
analyse the CSI data of each incoming packet. For a received packet using one spatial
stream, one model is used (Mod1,1). For a received packet transmitted using two spatial
streams, two additional models are used (one for each received spatial stream; Mod2,1,
Mod2,2), and for a packet received using three spatial streams, three additional models
are used (Mod3,1, Mod3,2, Mod3,3). Thus, 6 spatial models can be created to analyse
incoming packets; however, in practice we did not observe a useful number of packets
(less than 50 packets during the entire experiment) using 3 spatial streams and, thus,
only 3 models become active in this experiment (Mod1,1, Mod2,1, Mod2,2). Figure 5.3
shows the model output for Mod1,1, Mod2,1, Mod2,2 and of the combined Model Modc
over the duration of the experiment. The output of Modc is the tamper-evidence level
that we use to decide if a node has been tampered with. Modc is created by combining
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Figure 5.3: Experiment 1 - Tamper evidence over time with device movement. Model outputs
for packets received with different spatial streams are combined into the overall
model to produce a single tamper evidence value.
the output of models Mod1,1, Mod2,1, Mod2,2 (see Section 5.1.1).
Before a model becomes operational, it requires a history size of \tau = 50 CSI data,
which means that, for each model, 50 packets with the appropriate number of spatial
streams must be received. A history size of 50 was chosen for the training phase as this
provided stable results for our experiments. In a different scenario a shorter training
phase might be possible. As the number of streams may change for each packet, a
different amount of time is required for each model before it is operational. In this
experiment, Mod1,1 becomes active first after t = 88 s, while Mod2,1 and Mod2,2 become
active at t = 314 s. The three models used for packets with three spatial streams never
become active as, throughout the entire experiment, not enough packets of this type
are received to fill the history. During this training phase, it must be ensured that no




As can be seen in Figure 5.3a, model Mod1,1 produces far fewer data points than the
other two models. The reason is that the 802.11n transmitter uses two spatial streams for
most transmissions, and transmissions using only one spatial transmission are rare. As a
result, there are time periods (e.g. between t = 14min and t = 30min) where the model
output is 0, which means that no recent data for this model is available and, thus, this
model in these periods is not useful as a contributor to the overall model Modc. However,
as long as data packets are received, there is at least one model active contributing to
Modc and, therefore, a tamper-evidence value is always provided. Only in situations
where no packet is received at all would no model be active; however, in a practical
setting, a lack of received data (or heart-beat messages) for a period of time may be
considered as a tamper situation anyway.
Tampering in the form of movement of the transmitter by 1 cm starts at t = 15min.
This event can clearly be seen in the tamper-evidence value provided by model Modc
(see Figure 5.3d). The tamper-evidence value increases from t = 15min onwards with a
gradient determined by the window size tw. A smaller window size would lead to faster
increase of the tamper-evidence value. However, as we will show in Experiment 3, it is
not always desirable to use a small window size, as a large window helps us to suppress
high tamper-evidence levels caused by movement instead of tampering. A threshold
could now be selected to decide a tamper-evidence level, beyond which the transmitter
would be no longer considered to be trustworthy. The max and mean values shown in
Figure 5.3d might help for threshold selection. For example, a threshold set to twice the
value of mean might be a useful selection.
As shown in Figure 5.3d, all tested positions of the transmitter different to the original
position are clearly visible as a tamper situation. It has to be noted that the tamper-
evidence value, which depends on movement distance, is not a monotone increasing
function. An increase in distance to the original device position may lead to a reduction
of the tamper-evidence value. However, no movement in our experiment set leads to
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max(Dτ)
mean(Dτ)
(\bfd ) Modc, window size tw = 30 s, tw = 180 s and
tw = 300 s
Figure 5.4: Experiment 2 - Tamper evidence over time in an environment with device replace-
ment (tampering) at t = 10min. Tamper evidence levels are rising faster for smaller
window sizes tw.
From t = 74min onwards, we see a small periodic change in the output of Mod2,1 and
Mod2,2. This periodic change is potentially caused by an interferer (such as a heating
system) active during the experiment.
5.2.1.2 Experiment 2: Device Replacement
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 5.4. We did not observe a useful
number of packets using 3 spatial streams and, thus, only 3 models become active in
this experiment (Mod1,1, Mod2,1, Mod2,2). Figure 5.4d shows the tamper-evidence value
which is the output of the combined model Modc. The output of Modc is shown for
different window sizes tw. Mod1,1 becomes first after t = 72 s, while Mod2,1 and Mod2,2
become active after t = 213 s when enough packets using 2 spatial streams are received
to fill the history of \tau = 50 values.
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At t = 10min the device is tampered with and the NIC is replaced. In this experiment,
we use external antennas connected to the NIC to ensure that only the device is replaced
while all antennas remain at exactly the same position.
We can clearly see in Figures 5.4b and 5.4c that the tamper-evidence value D changes
immediately. The output D\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{A} is changing more slowly, as an average of values of
D over the past duration of tw = 180 s is used. Figure 5.4d shows the output of the
combined model for different window sizes tw (see Section 5.1.1). Obviously, using a
smaller window size leads to faster detection, but the algorithm would be more prone to
false alarms as outliers would make a greater contribution to the tamper-evidence value.
A threshold at twice the average tamper-evidence value, mean, could be used as
alarm threshold. In this case, the device replacement would be indicated after t = 605 s
when using a window size of tw = 30 s. With a window size of tw = 300 s, the replacement
would be indicated substantially after t = 678 s. However, using a smaller window size is
not without cost, as we will show in the next experiment.
5.2.1.3 Experiment 3: Pedestrians
In this experiment, a person walks slowly 3 times through the line of sight between sender
and receiver. The first walk is at t = 15min, the second at t = 16min, and the third at
t = 17min. Figure 5.5 shows the output of the models. Figure 5.5g shows the tamper-
evidence value, which is the output of the combined model Modc (see Section 5.1.1).
This is shown for different window sizes tw.
The walks are visible in the tamper-evidence value. However, for all selected window
sizes the tamper-evidence value returns after a while to the base line, indicating no
tamper situation. This is different to the previous two situations of device movement
and device replacement where the tamper-evidence value does not return to the original
value. As can be seen in Figure 5.5g, the window size influences the maximum tamper-
evidence value that is reached. Large windows suppress high tamper-evidence values for
environmental changes such as those caused by a pedestrian. When using a threshold at
twice the average tamper-evidence value, mean, an alarm situation can be avoided with
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max(Dτ)
mean(Dτ)
(\bfg ) Modc, window size tw = 30 s, tw = 180 s and
tw = 300 s
Figure 5.5: Experiment 3 - Tamper evidence over time in an environment with movement at
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max(Dτ)
mean(Dτ)
(\bff ) Modc, window size tw = 180 s
Figure 5.6: Experiment 4 - Tamper evidence in a tamper free environment. The tamper evidence
value remains static at a low level over a long period of time.
a window size of tw = 300 s, but not for a window size of tw = 30 s.
Comparing the results of this experiment with the results of the previous two experi-
ments, it becomes clear that the selection of the window size over which analysis results
are averaged has an influence on i) detection time and ii) suppression of false alarms.
5.2.1.4 Experiment 4: Baseline
This experiment was carried out at night to avoid fluctuations of channel characteristics
due to moving people and interference by electronic devices. Figure 5.6 shows the output
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of the models. We did not observe a useful number of packets using 1 spatial stream
and, therefore, Mod1,1 was not active in this experiment. The output of Modc when
using a window size of tw = 180 s is, as seen in Figure 5.6f, a flat line without significant
variation; the maximum tamper-evidence value for a window size of tw = 180 s is 0.17,
and the minimum is 0.15 within the 1.5 h duration. This demonstrates that a continuous
upgrade of the used history data (a retraining of the model) is not required. It can be
expected that, in a static and tamper-free environment, the tamper-evidence value is
stable.
5.2.1.5 Discussion
Detection: Our experiments have shown that device movement and device replacement
can both be detected. Even small device movements of just 1 cm are clearly visible in
the computed tamper-evidence value.
False Alarms: False alarms can be triggered by changes in the environment instead
of tampering. As shown, by selecting a large window size tw, false alarms can be avoided
in silent environment while reducing the detection speed. We will investigate false alarms
more in the following section where we evaluate multi-receiver tamper detection.
5.2.2 Multi-Receiver Tamper Detection
We start our evaluation for multi-receiver tamper detection with a controlled movement
experiment. In this experiment only one person is present and movement of the person
in the deployment area is known. This experiment is used to analyse how distance values
extracted from the CSI are affected by movement. Furthermore, the experiment shows
that the use of multiple receivers is an effective measure for distinguishing movement
and tamper events.
Thereafter an experiment with uncontrolled movement is carried out. Nodes are
deployed in an office environment in which office workers move around during the day.
At night there is less activity but occasionally people are present. In this experiment we
do not record the number of people or their movements. The purpose of this experiment
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Figure 5.7: A laptop and an antenna used in the experiments. Only the antenna is tampered
(moved or rotated) during the experiments.
is to see how different configurations of the tamper detection algorithm handle realistic
environments with different levels of activity. We use this experiment as well to evaluate
several different tamper situations to see how likely it is that different tamper situations
are to be detected.
We use off-the-shelf Toshiba NB250-108 laptops equipped with an Intel 5300 NIC
for our experiments. The laptops run Ubuntu 14.04 LTS with the 3.5.7 kernel. We use
the Linux 802.11n CSI Tool [HHSW11] to extract CSI from the Intel 5300 NICs. Each
NIC is equipped with a triple TP-Link TL-ANT2403N 802.11n omni-directional antenna.
Figure 5.7 shows one of the laptops with antenna. To induce tampering, the antenna is
moved or rotated.
5.2.2.1 Controlled Movement
We use 4 receivers and one transmitter deployed in an office building as shown in
Figure 5.8. The transmitter sends broadcast beacons with a 1 packet/second interval.
All receivers listen for these packets and extract the CSI from incoming packets.
A history size of \tau = 100 CSI readings is required before receivers calculate distance
values. Figure 5.9 shows as an example how the CSI amplitude values develop over time.
Values as received by the 2nd antenna of Receiver 3 are shown; similar data is available
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Figure 5.8: Controlled movement experiment layout. Receivers are shown as R1-4, and trans-
mitter is shown as T. The environment is static during the experiment. A person is

























Figure 5.9: CSI amplitude values of 2nd antenna of Receiver 3 during the controlled movement
experiment. Amplitude values change occasionally due to movement until a tamper
event at time t = 21.5min.
for the other 2 antennas. The x-axis shows the time in minutes, and the y-axis shows
the amplitude at each OFDM subcarrier. It can be seen that amplitude values change
occasionally due to movement of a person until tampering happens at time t = 21.5min
which is clearly visible. We detail movement patterns and tampering events in the next
paragraphs.
Figures 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 show the distance value development over time at all
4 receivers using Euclidean, Mahalanobis, and Earth Mover's distance algorithms. We
show the Maximum Distance threshold max(D\tau ) in the figures. Figure 5.13 shows the
resulting tamper detection decision qi considering each receiver individually when using
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(\bfd ) Receiver 4
Figure 5.10: Euclidean distance in the controlled movement experiment. Tampering is induced
at t = 21.5min. Distance values at each receiver increase occasionally until this
time due to movement.
the Euclidean distance (We do not show the result for Mahalanobis, and Earth Mover
as these are very similar). The overall tamper decision Qi considering all 4 receivers
combined is shown in Figure 5.14 for Euclidean, Mahalanobis, and Earth Mover's distance
algorithms. The tamper event at t = 21.5min is clearly identified; movement events
before this time do not lead to a tampering report.
All the receivers start to report distance values after 100 seconds. At the beginning
of the experiment, a person is waiting in Room 1.
At time t = 3.5min, the person walks close to Receiver 4, waits next to Receiver 4 for
a minute, and then enters Room 1. We can see in the figures that this affects distance
values at Receiver 4 and very slightly at Receiver 3. Since we do not see any increase on
distance values of Receiver 1 and Receiver 2, the system will not create a false alarm
when considering data from all receivers.
At time t = 9.5min, the person walks very close to Receiver 3, waits next to Receiver 3
for a minute, and then enters Room 1. This affects the distance values of Receiver 3 and
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(\bfd ) Receiver 4
Figure 5.11: Mahalanobis distance in the controlled movement experiment. Tampering is
induced at t = 21.5min. Distance values at each receiver increase occasionally
until this time due to movement.
Receiver 4. Again, there is no significant change on the distance values of Receiver 1 and
Receiver 2.
At time t = 15.5min, the person walks very close to Receiver 1, waits next to
Receiver 1 for two minutes, then moves to Receiver 2 at time t = 17.5min and waits
next to Receiver 2 for a minute, and finally enters Room 2. We can see from the figures
that distance values increase for Receiver 3 and Receiver 4 at time t = 15.5min. This
is because the person needs to pass by Receiver 3 and Receiver 4 to go to Receiver 1.
Distance values for Receiver 3 and Receiver 4 go back to normal as distance values
for Receiver 1 increase. The system does not create a false alarm when considering all
receivers together as it does not see distance value increases above the threshold at all
receivers at the same time.
At time t = 21.5min, the person rotates the antenna of the transmitter 90\circ clockwise,
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Figure 5.12: Earth Mover's distance in the controlled movement experiment. Tampering is
induced at t = 21.5min. Distance values at each receiver increase occasionally
until this time due to movement.
At time t = 24.5min, the person walks very close to Receiver 1, waits next to
Receiver 1 for a minute, and enters Room 2. Distance values of Receiver 1 and Receiver 2
slightly change during this period but remain above the threshold. Thus, the tamper
situation remains. The experiment terminates around time t = 28.5min.
Figure 5.13 shows decisions qi for each receiver (considering individual receiver results)
when using Euclidean distance algorithm and max(D\tau ) as the threshold. The x-axis
shows the time in minutes, and y-axis shows the decisions. Decision 0 means there is no
tampering, and decision 1 means there is tampering.
From Figure 5.13 we can see that false alarms exist when considering individual
receivers. FPRs are 0.08, 0.06, 0.11, and 0.12 for Receivers 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
However, from Figure 5.14 we can see that multi-receiver tamper detection provides
the desired results. All the distance algorithms provide FPR = 0 result. Both Euclidean
and Mahalanobis distance algorithms have a TPR = 1, however, the Earth Mover's
distance algorithm provides only TPR = 0.94.
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Figure 5.13: Tamper decisions (qi) for each individual receiver in the controlled movement
experiment using Euclidean distance and max(D\tau ) as threshold. False alarms due
to movement are present before the tampering event at t = 21.5min.
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Figure 5.14: Multi-receiver tamper decisions (Qi) for the controlled movement experiment.
All receivers are taken into account and max(D\tau ) is used as threshold. False
alarms are avoided (FPR = 0) while the tamper event is correctly identified (For
Euclidean and Mahalanobis distance algorithms with TPR = 1 and for the Earth
Mover's distance algorithm with TPR = 0.94).
Euclidean, Mahalanobis, and Earth Mover's distance algorithms perform similarly.
This is somewhat surprising as they operate quite differently and one would have expected














Figure 5.15: Uncontrolled movement experiment layout. People are moving in the rooms and
in the corridor inducing CSI variations.
Figure 5.16: Euclidean distance for the uncontrolled movement experiment. Tamper events are
indicated with vertical lines. Distance values of each receiver show tampering and
also movement during office hours.
results.
5.2.2.2 Uncontrolled Movement
The uncontrolled movement experiment is carried out in the same environment as the
controlled movement experiment. However, the transmitter and the 4 receivers are
located in different rooms as shown in Figure 5.15. People use the offices and corridors
and may also move chairs and other objects. Movement events of people and objects may
lead to false tamper detection which we aim to avoid. The transmitter sends broadcast
beacons for tamper detection with a 1 packet/second interval.
The experiment starts while the transmitter is in a tampered state. The transmitter
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\bfD \bfa \bfy \bfN \bfi \bfg \bfh \bft 
\bfT \bfi \bfm \bfe \bfT \bfy \bfp \bfe \bfT \bfi \bfm \bfe \bfT \bfy \bfp \bfe \bfT \bfi \bfm \bfe \bfT \bfy \bfp \bfe \bfT \bfi \bfm \bfe \bfT \bfy \bfp \bfe 
12:00 90\circ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w} 12:10 180\circ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w} 20:00 90\circ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w} 20:10 180\circ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w}
12:20 270\circ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w} 12:30 360\circ (0\circ ) \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w} 20:20 270\circ \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w} 20:30 360\circ (0\circ ) \mathrm{c}\mathrm{w}
12:40 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 12:50 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t} 20:40 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 20:50 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}
13:00 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 13:10 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 21:00 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 21:10 1 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}
13:20 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 13:30 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t} 21:20 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 21:30 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}
13:40 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 13:50 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 21:40 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 21:50 2 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}
14:00 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 14:10 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t} 22:00 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 22:10 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}
14:20 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 14:30 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 22:20 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 22:30 3 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}
14:40 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 14:50 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t} 22:40 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 22:50 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}
15:00 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 15:10 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 23:00 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 23:10 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}
15:20 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 15:30 5 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t} 23:20 4 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{u}\mathrm{p} 23:30 5 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}
15:40 5 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 15:50 5 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 23:40 5 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{n} 23:50 5 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}
16:00 30 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 16:10 60 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 00:00 30 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t} 00:10 60 \mathrm{c}\mathrm{m} \mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}
16:20 \mathrm{O}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l} 00:20 \mathrm{O}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}
Table 5.1: The different tamper events and their times.
antenna is rotated by 90\circ anticlockwise from its intended position. After a while the
antenna is rotated to its intended position, i.e., it is transited to the untampered state.
In both states (tampered and untampered) data for threshold selection as described in
Section 5.1.2.1 is collected. A history size of \tau = 100 CSI data is also collected during the
untampered state when we can ensure that the environment is free of movement. Then,
the setup is left for a long time in an untampered state. Then different tamper states are
induced during day time and later as well at night. The Euclidean distance metric is
used for evaluation. Figure 5.16 shows this distance value over time for all 4 receivers.
The experiment starts at 18:00 on 18th of May when the antenna of the transmitter
is rotated 90\circ anticlockwise from its intended position. The antenna is rotated to its
intended position at 12:06 on 19th of May. Several tamper situations are induced from
12:00 until 16:20 on May 20th (see Table 5.1 for details). To compare tamper detection
in busy and more quiet periods, the same tamper events are applied again starting 20:00
on May 20th. Training CSI values are collected at 01:00 on May 20th (shown as vertical
black line in Figure 5.16). Maximum distance values within the training data are also
shown in the figure as max(D\tau ). The distance values of the packets not received by a
receiver are shown as 0 in Figure 5.16. Tamper events are shown in Figure 5.16 with
vertical dashed lines at their corresponding times.
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Table 5.2: FPRs and TPRs when using max(D\tau ) as the threshold.






















Figure 5.17: ROC curve of the 4 receivers.
Maximum Distance Threshold Figure 5.16 shows that distance values are above
max(D\tau ) during office hours when there is no tampering. In a busy environment,
max(D\tau ) is too sensitive and a high FPR is the consequence. Using max(D\tau ) as the
threshold results in FPRs and TPRs as shown in Table 5.2. FPR results are divided
into three time regions: (i) Night time between 01:02 and 08:00 when the experiment
environment is less dynamic, (ii) Day time between 08:00 and 12:00 when the experiment
environment is dynamic, and (ii) Overall (day and night combined). TPR results are
also divided into two time regions: (i) Night time between 20:00 and 00:30 when the
experiment environment is less dynamic, (ii) Day time between 12:00 and 16:00 when
the experiment environment is dynamic. TPRs from different tamper events are aver-
aged resulting in a single TPR value (We will analyse TPR of individual tamper states
later). Although we obtain a high TPR for both time durations and also 0 FPR during
night time, we observe a high FPRs during day time. We thus conclude that using the
maximum distance threshold max(D\tau ) is not suitable for busy environments.
Equal Error Rate Threshold The experiment starts while the transmitter is in a
tampered state, then it is transited to untampered state after a while. We can use the
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\bfT \bfa \bfm \bfp \bfe \bfr \bfe \bfd \bfs \bft \bfa \bft \bfe 18:00 18\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h} \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f} \mathrm{M}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y} - 12:06 19\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h} \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f} \mathrm{M}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}
\bfU \bfn \bft \bfa \bfm \bfp \bfe \bfr \bfe \bfd \bfs \bft \bfa \bft \bfe 12:06 19\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h} \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f} \mathrm{M}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y} - 01:00 20\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h} \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f} \mathrm{M}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}
Table 5.3: Time ranges of tampered and untampered states for ROC calculation.
\bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bfone \bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bftwo \bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bfthree \bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bffour 
0.032 0.148 0.036 0.258
Table 5.4: EERs for all the receivers in the uncontrolled experiment.














Figure 5.18: FPRs and TPRs with different thresholds. FPRs are always 0 during the night
time. max(D\tau ) gives high FPRs. \gamma EER reduces both FPRs and TPRs. \gamma FNR=0
gives more balanced results.
distance values from the initial tampered and untampered state to calculate the ROC
curve. The ROC curve can then be used to select a threshold based on the desired FPR
and TPR rates as previously discussed in Section 5.1.2.1. Table 5.3 shows the time ranges
of tampered and untampered states for ROC calculation. Figure 5.17 shows the ROC
curve of our 4 different receivers during this training time. Thresholds ranging from 0.001
to 1 with 0.001 intervals are applied to the distance values.
We calculate the EER for each receiver. The EER is the rate where the FPR and
FNR are equal. Table 5.4 shows the EERs for all the receivers. Figure 5.18 shows the
achievable FPRs and TPRs for the overall decision Qi using this threshold \gamma EER.
\gamma EER reduces the FPRs dramatically. The FPR during the day is 0.00024 and it
averages 0.00022 over the entire experiment. Unfortunately, the resulting detection
capability of the system is low; TPRs of only 0.148 during night time and 0.096 during
day time are achieved. However, for some applications it might be acceptable to have
such a low TPR.
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\bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bfone \bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bftwo \bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bfthree \bfR \bfe \bfc \bfe \bfi \bfv \bfe \bfr \bffour 
\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}(D\tau ) 0.204 0.406 0.219 0.390
\gamma EER 0.577 0.519 0.500 0.507
\gamma FNR=0 0.419 0.386 0.355 0.396
Table 5.5: Threshold values for each receiver.

















Figure 5.19: Effect of time-wise filtering on FPRs and TPRs when using \gamma FNR=0 as the threshold.
tw = 60 s reduces FPRs to 0, but it also reduces TPRs.
Zero False Negative Threshold If we select a threshold lower than the EER threshold,
we may have a chance to increase the TPR. We select the maximum threshold where the
ROC curve gives a FNR = 0, \gamma FNR=0. Table 5.5 shows the all thresholds for each receiver,
and Figure 5.18 shows the result Qi based on the threshold \gamma FNR=0. This threshold helps
to increase TPRs (0.69 during night and 0.7 during the day), but we also increase the
FPRs (0.045 during day and 0.041 overall). This threshold achieves a good TPR but the
FPR is too high for many practical applications. We apply time-wise filtering to address
this issue.
Time-Wise Filtering We use window sizes of tw \in \{ 10, 30, 60\} seconds, and the decision
is made that there is tampering when it was decided there was tampering for all individual
packets within the window. Figure 5.19 shows the effect of time-wise filtering over FPRs
and TPRs when using \gamma FNR=0 as the threshold. Increasing tw decreases the FPR. The
FPR is reduced from 0.045 to 0 during day time, and it is reduced from 0.04 to 0 overall
when tw = 60 s. However, using a 60 s window reduces the average TPR from 0.69 to
0.58 during night time, and from 0.7 to 0.53 during day time.
Clearly, it is possible even in a busy environment to use CSI-based tamper detection
without risking false alarms while detecting a reasonable number of tamper situations.
105
Chapter 5 Evaluation

















Figure 5.20: Effect of number of receivers to make a decision on FPRs and TPRs, when using
\gamma FNR=0 as the threshold and without using time-wise filtering. Increasing the
number of receivers reduces both FPR and TPR.
Using Multiple Receivers Until now, all of the decisions were made by using reports
from all the receivers. All of the receivers needed to receive the packet, and that packet
had to provide a distance above the thresholds for all receivers. The question is how
many receivers should be used and what the contribution is of each additional receiver to
FPRs and TPRs.
We used a total of N = 4 receivers in the experiment. We can use 1, 2, 3, or all of
them to make a tamper decision. Figure 5.20 shows the tamper decision results when
using \gamma FNR=0 as the threshold and without using time-wise filtering. Results are averaged
for different combinations of receivers for a given number of receivers, n. For example, if
we use n = 3 we calculate the results using receivers \{ 1, 2, 3\} , \{ 1, 2, 4\} , \{ 1, 3, 4\} , and
\{ 2, 3, 4\} in groups and take the average.
Figure 5.20 shows that using an increasing number of receivers decreases the FPRs.
If we use more than 4 receivers to make a decision, we might obtain even better FPRs.
However, using more receivers also decreases TPRs.
Tamper Event Detectability Previously, all the TPRs from different tamper events
were averaged and shown as a single result. In this section, we analyse individual TPRs
for the different tamper states. We applied different tamper events during the day and
night. These tamper events are shown in Table 5.1.
Figure 5.21 shows the results when using \gamma FNR=0 as the threshold and without using




















































































































































































































































































(\bfc ) Tamperings during the night time, sorted by TPRs.
Figure 5.21: TPRs for different tamper events when using \gamma FNR=0 as the threshold and without
using time-wise filtering.
not receive beacons during the events 2 cm left at night, 4 cm up at night, and 60 cm
left at night. These results are not shown in the figure.
Figure 5.21a shows TPRs for tamper events in order of their execution while Fig-
ure 5.21b and Figure 5.21c show them ordered by TPR night and day values. We can
see from this that the magnitude of tampering (moved distance) does not correlate with
detectability. It can also be seen that most tamper events can clearly be detected while
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a minority are hard to detect.
The minimum TPR value during the day time is 0.0034, the maximum is 1, and the
average is 0.704. During the night time, the minimum TPR value is 0, the maximum is
1, and the average is 0.691.
5.2.2.3 Discussion
In the previous sections we have described and analysed multi-receiver CSI tamper
detection. Now we discuss how these methods can be put to work in practice to secure a
Wi-Fi based WSN setup. We first discuss potential capabilities of such a system based on
the previously shown evaluations. We then discuss how a practical Wi-Fi based system
can incorporate the methods described and, finally, we describe how such system can be
operated in a practical setting.
System Capability Many WSN systems are used to monitor and control critical infras-
tructure such as airports, refineries, hospitals or military installations. Additional layers
of defence guarding the installation against tampering and other attacks are desirable.
CSI tamper detection is a valuable building block in this context.
The evaluation has shown that in different deployment settings different FPR and
TPR rates are achievable. The level of tolerable FPR and required TPR depends very
much on the application scenario. The question is: in which application scenarios could
the described system be employed?
A large number of WSN systems are deployed in areas with little variation in the
environment. For example, systems are used to monitor and control production processes
in refineries or power plants. Workers move throughout these installations but movement
is limited; times of high activity are often known in advance (e.g. scheduled maintenance).
In these settings a minimal FPR is required (ideally zero) as false alarms require costly
investigation of the situation. On the other hand a high TPR is required to ensure that
tampering with devices is detected. Our evaluation shows that requirements of such a
setup can be fulfilled.
Other WSN setups are in relatively busy environments. For example, a wireless camera
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system used to monitor an office building would experience high levels of movement. In
such a setting a zero FPR can also be achieved but only when making some sacrifices on
the achievable TPR. However, if CSI tamper detection is used as an additional layer of
defence and not the only security mechanism a TPR below 1 may already bring significant
added value to the overall security of the system.
From our evaluations we conclude that CSI tamper detection is feasible with (i)
perfect FPR (FPR = 0) and perfect TPR (TPR = 1) in settings with limited movement;
and (ii) perfect FPR (FPR = 0) and good TPR (TPR = 0.53) in settings with high
levels of movement.
System Design A system using Wi-Fi enabled nodes would likely operate in an in-
frastructure mode. Devices such as cameras would transmit data via access points
interconnected by a fixed wired backbone. It can be assumed that multiple access points
are in communication range of a device. We therefore suggest extending the functionality
of access points to collect CSI information. The collected CSI information is then for-
warded to a central system which carries out CSI-based tamper detection. To enable CSI
collection at multiple access points nodes must transmit broadcast frames. This can be
achieved by having nodes transmit periodic beacons for the purpose of tamper detection
(in our experiments a one second interval was used). Using regular data transmissions of
the nodes is less suitable as 802.11n adjusts the number of spatial streams and CSI is
dependent on the number of spatial streams (see 5.2.1). However, existing beaconing of
nodes can be reused for the purpose of tamper detection. The system must allow secure
collection of CSI data at access points which we believe is not trivial but achievable.
Deployment and Operation A system using multi-receiver CSI tamper detection re-
quires a training phase when it is deployed. Depending on the application requirements,
different thresholds might be used (max(D\tau ), \gamma EER and \gamma FNR=0) to achieve the desired
FPR and TPR rates. The different thresholds have different complexity in terms of
deployment and training.
Using max(D\tau ) requires a very short training phase. In our experiments we used
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100 packets transmitted over a period of 100s. However, during the transmission of
these packets it must be ensured that the system is in an untampered state and that the
environment is quiet.
Using \gamma EER and \gamma FNR=0 requires training data which contains a tampered state. This
can be achieved by treating the initial placement location of a node as a tampered
reference state in which data is collected over a period of time. Thereafter the node is
placed in its operation location which is the untampered state. During the tampered and
untampered state training data are collected to calculate the thresholds as previously
described.
We believe that the described setup procedure is feasible for many application scenarios.
For example, when a security system is deployed in a restricted area it is possible to
ensure no movement in this area during installation.
Once a system is deployed it may happen that the communication environment
changes naturally and the initial selected thresholds are invalidated. For example, smaller
building alterations would change the observed CSI. These situations can be identified
by an increase in the FPR rate and a re-initialisation of the system is required.
5.3 Chapter Summary
We have shown that 802.11n CSI information measured at a receiver for each incoming
packet can be used to create a tamper-evidence value which indicates potential tampering
with the sender. In particular, our method is able to handle changing spatial stream
configurations of 802.11n transmission. We have shown that tampering in the form
of device movement or device replacement are clearly detectable. Detection of device
replacement can be used for node identification. Furthermore, we have shown that alarms
from tamper-unrelated environment changes, such as pedestrians, can be avoided by
using multiple receivers. We provided more reliable tamper detection mechanism that
can be used in practical deployments.
Although manyWSN devices make use of 802.11n for communication, other transceiver
types are also in use. The proposed methods can directly be applied to other commu-
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nication systems based on OFDM. Other systems will describe the wireless channel
differently. However, we believe that any information describing the communication
channel is useful input for a tamper detection mechanism.
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Conclusion and Future Work
As Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are being deployed in critical applications, their
secure and reliable operation is of great importance. WSNs operate with scarce resources,
so traditional security solutions cannot be directly adapted to WSNs. Existing solutions
must be modified or new solutions must be proposed. This thesis has contributed to the
development of new security mechanisms for WSNs on areas lacking much attention from
the research community. It is important to optimise the usage of limited node resources.
To this end, this thesis introduced frameworks that will improve the performance of
security protocols on WSNs, and contributed methods for node identification without
using costly cryptographic mechanisms.
6.1 Contributions
Chapter 3 presented Codo, a framework for efficient secure data storage in WSNs. Codo
provides fast and energy-efficient data storage and retrieval, addressing the required
level of protection. A design specification and a detailed implementation of Codo for
the Contiki operating system running on a Tmote Sky node were included. Different
aspects of Codo were also evaluated. The confidential data storage framework was then
combined with secure communication, removing the duplication of security operations on
the sensor node. This combined secure-storage and communication framework increases
the performance and decreases the energy expenditure of the sensor node. The prototype
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implementation showed that combined secure storage and communication can reduce
security-related processing on nodes by up to 71\% and energy consumption by up to
32.1\%. A detailed definition of the framework for IP/6LoWPAN networks was presented
in the chapter. An implementation of the framework for the Contiki operating system
and a detailed evaluation of the performance gains were also given.
In Chapter 4, sensor node identification based on clock skew was explained. Clock
skew calculation is done locally on the sensor node with the usage of local clocks. Local
clock skew calculation can overcome the constant network delay required for remote clock
skew calculation, which is problematic in duty-cycled WSNs. It has been shown that
a sample period of 7.8125ms and a sample size of 200 are sufficient to determine clock
skew locally with the same quality as a remote technique with a sample period of 4s and
a sample size of 2500. A description of the method for local clock skew calculation of a
node's crystal-based real-time clock using the high-precision clock available on modern
transceivers was provided. The implementation of this method for Zolertia Z1 nodes
using the Contiki operating system was also explained. Additionally, the dependency of
clock skew calculation quality and clock sampling effort was analysed.
In Chapter 5, the CSI of a wireless channel was used for node identification and tamper
detection. 802.11n networks use the OFDM modulation scheme. In OFDM, receivers
estimate the channel conditions and send them to the transmitters. The estimation
is called CSI, and provides rich information about the wireless channel. Any change
in the wireless channel affects the CSI, and it has been shown that these effects can
be used to identify nodes and to detect tampering with them. Any tampering on the
wireless device will cause changes on CSI values. However, tamper-unrelated events, like
movement of people in the communication environment, also lead to CSI fluctuations and
cause false alarms. Analysing CSI values of incoming packets simultaneously on multiple
receivers can help to distinguish tamper and movement events. It has been shown that the
proposed system deployed in a busy office environment achieved 53\% tamper detection
while raising zero false alarms. Necessary algorithms for tamper detection using single
and multiple receivers were described in the chapter. The tamper detection capability of
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the proposed algorithm using realistic deployment environments were also analysed.
6.2 Threat Models and Limitations
In this section we discuss about the threat models and limitations of the proposed
methods in each chapter.
Confidential Data Storage for Wireless Sensor Network In Chapter 3, we combined
secure storage and communication for WSN. In this work, we used pre-deployed keys.
Key management and in particular the usage of keys are dependent on the application
scenario. The main aspect to consider is who will consume a data packet. In typical
scenarios, a host requests data from a node that then generates a data packet, for example
a temperature reading, protects it with a communication security protocol, and transmits.
This work also target applications where nodes generate data, store it in the file system,
and transmit data on request at a later stage. This stored data may be requested by a
single host or by multiple hosts.
Data readings are stored in a file and a specific key is used for encryption (and
potentially for authentication if used). In this case the key used to protect the file is
shared with the remote hosts who consume this data. If the same data file is consumed
by multiple hosts there is no need of confidentiality among these hosts for this data. In
rare cases, if it is considered problematical to use one shared key among a group of hosts
it is possible to store data readings of the same type in multiple files with individual
keys. This allows us to issue individual keys to accessing hosts while still retaining the
performance benefits in requesting pre-encrypted data. However, in this case data is
stored multiple times which leads to a significant increase in storage requirements. This
increase in storage requirements may not be problematical if nodes are equipped with
enough flash storage space. If a node is compromised [ZYN08] it can be added in a
blacklist maintained by an intrusion detection system [RWV13] and all keys held by this
node must be invalidated.
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Node Identification Based on Clock Skew In Chapter 4, we are considering an attacker
who is trying to impersonate a sensor node. The attacker can do this by obtaining the key
that used for identification and authentication. Our aim is to introduce an additional layer
of protection, which we do by binding the identification process to the node hardware.
In this work we assume the attacker does not have physical access to the sensor node,
and he is unable to modify the software running on the device.
Initial experiments have shown that the measured clock skew depends on temperature.
A node would need to be profiled in terms of skew over the expected temperature range.
Skew values would have to be transmitted together with a temperature reading in order
to allow identification in deployments with varying temperature. An attacker can use this
temperature effect maliciously and prevent the proposed system from working properly
by changing the temperature of the environment that the sensor operates in.
Tamper Detection and Node Identification Based on CSI In Chapter 5, we are
considering an attacker who is capable of physically tampering with a device. We assume
that the attacker is able to move or rotate the device. Our aim is to detect such device
movements with a high detection reliability and a low false alarm rate.
In this work, we do not consider physical tampering with internal components of
the device. We do not aim to detect replacement of device components such as the
micro-controller. Additionally, we do not assume the attacker is able to change the
software running on the device. To protect against internal device tampering, other
protection methods than the one discussed in this work have to be used.
Depending on the selected threshold, this work might require a long training phase.
Moreover, initial thresholds might be invalidated due to the natural changes in the
communication environment. In this case, re-initialisation of the system is required.
6.3 Discussions
In this section we talk about the generalizability and the applicability of the works
presented in the thesis. We also discuss the cost and scope of the proposed techniques.
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Avoiding duplication of cryptographic operations on a sensor node is crucial as it
has limited battery life and processing power. This thesis has shown in Chapter 3
that combining secure storage and communication solutions removes the redundant
cryptographic operations, and dramatically reduces the security-related processing and
energy usage. Considering security of a system as a whole rather than concentrating on
individual parts helps to optimise the usage of the resources. The framework presented
here uses only the IPsec protocol to secure the communication link, however, it would
still be applicable to other protocols such as DTLS.
IPsec protocol is widely adapted to existing operating systems, and there is no
extra cost on the host side to use the framework. Proposed method does not require
extra hardware or any hardware modifications on sensor nodes. The framework only
requires modification on sensor node operating system. We believe that the sensor node
platforms can use the framework for many years, because both secure storage and secure
communication are essential components of WSNs security.
The thesis has also shown that hardware and channel characteristics can be used for
node identification and tamper detection. The methods proposed here do not require
cryptographic operations and, therefore, require fewer resources.
Node identification method based on clock skew presented in Chapter 4 would work
on any sensor node that has two clock sources. At least one of these clocks must be
precise enough to get clock skew results. Fortunately, radio transceivers have precise
clock sources and can be used for clock skew calculation. The method only requires small
modification (a wiring) on the sensor node. Since the sensor nodes will have at least two
clock sources (including a stable radio transceiver clock), we believe that the proposed
method will work many years.
The tamper detection algorithm presented in Chapter 5 conforms with OFDM-based
systems. Although other systems may use different modulation techniques and describe
the channel differently, any information describing the communication channel can be used
for a tamper detection mechanism. The method uses off-the-shelf 802.11n Wi-Fi cards
without requiring any hardware modification. Additionally, existing beaconing packets
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of Wi-Fi devices can be used to detect tamper events, which makes the deployment of
the method into the existing systems easier. The tamper detection algorithm does not
require extra hardware. The method can be used in Wi-Fi protocol as long as a version
of 802.11 that adapts Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is used.
6.4 Future Work
In this section we recommend and discuss possible future work for each of the key
contributions presented in the thesis.
Confidential Data Storage The combined secure storage and communication framework
presented in Chapter 3 uses the IPsec protocol to secure end-to-end communication.
DTLS is an alternative solution to IPsec. An instantiation of the combined framework
for DTLS is described in [BRRV15], but its evaluation is not presented. An evaluation
of the framework that quantifies performance enhancements and resource saving can be
examined. Additionally, the framework uses pre-shared keys. Automatic key management
support can be added, and its evaluation can be investigated.
The work in Chapter 3 has shown the importance of considering security of a system
as a whole. We focused at secure storage and communication steps here. However, similar
approaches can be investigated for different levels of security on WSNs.
Node Identification Based on Clock Skew Initial experiments in Chapter 4 have
shown that the measured clock skew is affected by temperature. An investigation of the
temperature effects can be carried out as future work. Additionally, more environmental
effects (such as humidity) that alter the clock behaviour can be investigated.
In this work we used crystal-based real-time clock of a node and high-precision clock
of a transceiver. Additional clock sources that have more precision than the one on the
transceiver can be investigated to achieve more stable clock skew numbers.
Tamper Detection and Node Identification Based on CSI The tamper detection
method proposed in Chapter 5 uses Wi-Fi networks. We showed its feasibility with a
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prototype application. Its integration to existing Wi-Fi operation can be investigated.
Additionally, integration of the technique with other existing communication protocols,
especially ones that use OFDM, can be investigated.
We have shown in the thesis that hardware characteristics can be used for identification,
which provide an additional layer of protection. Our methods use clock skew or wireless
channel information, and they are implemented on sensor nodes. We believe that there are
many more hardware characteristics that can be used for an additional layer of protection.
These are not only limited to sensor nodes, they can be used on other platforms as well.
For example, in our another work, we use quantum confinement to uniquely identify
devices [RBZ+15]. This method is a lightweight solution for device identification and
can be used on any device. Similarly, different sources and methods for additional layer
of protection for different platforms can be investigated as future work.
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